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ENHANCED SCRUTINY ON THE BUY-SIDE
Afra Afsharipour and J. Travis Laster**
Empirical studies of acquisitions consistently find
that public company bidders often overpay for targets,
imposing significant losses on bidder shareholders.
Numerous studies have connected bidder overpayment
with managerial agency costs and behavioral biases that
reflect management self-interest. For purposes of
corporate law, these concerns implicate the behavior of
fiduciaries—the officers and directors of the acquiring
entity—and raise questions about whether those
fiduciaries are fulfilling their duty of loyalty. To address
comparable sell-side concerns, the Delaware courts
developed an intermediate standard of review known as
enhanced scrutiny. There has been little exploration,
however, of whether the rationales for applying
enhanced scrutiny to the actions of sell-side fiduciaries
extend to comparable fiduciaries on the buy-side.
This Article addresses this long-neglected question.
Drawing upon the history of Delaware jurisprudence on
enhanced scrutiny, it argues that enhanced scrutiny
should extend to the decisions of buy-side fiduciaries.
The Article also recognizes that, although doctrinally
coherent, applying enhanced scrutiny to buy-side
decisions would open the door to well-documented
stockholder litigation pathologies that have undermined
the effectiveness of enhanced scrutiny for sell-side
decisions. To address these pathologies, the Delaware
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courts have recently encouraged the use of fully informed
stockholder votes on the sell-side to lessen litigation risk.
This Article reasons that a primary argument in favor of
extending enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions rests
not on the ability of the litigation itself to generate
superior outcomes, but rather as an inducement to more
frequent buy-side votes. This argument builds on recent
empirical literature which finds that stockholder voting
can provide an important counterbalance against the
self-interest and biases that lead to bidder overpayment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies of acquisitions consistently find that public
company bidders often overpay for targets, imposing significant
losses on bidder shareholders.1 Research also indicates that the
losses represent true wealth destruction in the aggregate and not
simply a wealth transfer from bidder shareholders to target
shareholders.2 Numerous studies have connected bidder
overpayment with managerial agency costs3 and behavioral biases
that reflect management self-interest.4 For purposes of corporate
law, these concerns implicate the behavior of fiduciaries—the
officers and directors of the acquiring entity—and raise questions
about whether those fiduciaries are fulfilling their duty of loyalty.
Beginning in the 1980s, to address circumstances that present a
high risk of self-interest, the Delaware courts began to develop an

1 See Afra Afsharipour, Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A Transactions,
70 OKLA. L. REV. 127, 133–34 (2017) (surveying research regarding bidder overpayment)
[hereinafter Afsharipour, Voting Rights]; Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option:
Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018, 1032–34 (2012)
(same) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Put Option].
2 Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of AcquiringFirm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757–59 (2005) [hereinafter Moeller
et al., Wealth Destruction].
3 See, e.g., Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to
Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 376 (2008); infra notes 34–42 and accompanying text.
For more on “empire building,” see Christopher Avery et al., Why Do Managers Undertake
Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness, 14 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 24, 24–28, 42 (1998); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 597, 627–28 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1167–69, 1224–29, 1269–80 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating]; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29
(1986).
4 See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 212
(1986) (finding that manager hubris may explain takeovers without gain); see also RICHARD
H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–62
(1992) (providing data highlighting suboptimal bidder behavior due to “the winner’s curse”);
Black, supra note 3, at 601–05, 624 (“Some managers, surely, are habitually optimistic and
therefore likely to overestimate a target’s value”); Mark L. Sirower & Mark Golovcsenko,
Returns from the Merger Boom, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Mar. 1, 2004, at
34, 2004 WLNR 18181954 (finding that the “subsequent performance of the persistent
performers is largely a function of acquirers confirming . . . the initial perceptions of
investors”); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193–
201 (1988) (presenting evidence “suggesting that the winner’s curse may be a common
phenomenon”).
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intermediate standard of review known as enhanced scrutiny.5 The
situations evaluated in these cases did not encompass the flagrant
self-dealing often observed in traditional duty of loyalty cases, but
instead involved the potential risk of soft conflicts and fiduciary selfinterest.6 Much of Delaware’s enhanced scrutiny jurisprudence was
developed through scrutiny of decisions by sell-side fiduciaries.7 We
argue that the enhanced scrutiny framework has become a means
of screening for improperly motivated actions “when the realities of
the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions of
even independent and disinterested directors.”8
Because the core conflict-derived rationale that supports
applying enhanced scrutiny to actions by sell-side fiduciaries
applies equally on the buy-side, we propose extending enhanced
scrutiny to the decisions of buy-side fiduciaries.9 The decision to
undertake a significant acquisition differs from other routine
business judgments taken by directors and officers. As in the sellside scenario, acquisitions are often large transactions that are
plagued by subtle personal interests that affect the decision-making
process.10 Empirical evidence suggests that in acquisitions,
particularly significant acquisitions, the business judgment of
boards is contaminated by the interests of managers and advisors

See infra Part III.A.
In many jurisdictions, corporate law may limit board discretion if the transaction
creates a possible conflict of interest for fiduciaries, “even if th[e] conflict does not qualify as
a related-party transaction.” Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 173 (3d ed. 2017). With
respect to fundamental transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, “[l]ow-powered
conflicts of interest frequently dog major transactions, even without signs of flagrant selfdealing.” Id.
7 See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It's True and What It Means,
19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2013).
8 Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011). See discussion
infra Part III.A.
9 Generally, Delaware courts have reviewed a board’s decision to acquire another
company under the deferential business judgment standard; therefore, the body of case law
addressing the fiduciary duties of buy-side boards is scant. For a discussion, see generally
Afsharipour, Put Option, supra note 1, at 1055–1061 (summarizing literature).
10 While not all mergers and acquisitions are fundamental or large transactions, many
“exhibit the functional characteristics of fundamental changes: they are large; they often give
rise to agency problems; and they involve investment-like decisions.” Rock et al., supra note
6, at 184 (citation omitted).
5
6
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on whom boards of directors rely.11 The board’s judgment is even
more contaminated in public company acquisitions where the
potential for realization of the value of the transaction is uncertain,
but the prestige and compensation connected with purchasing
another public company is high.12
Although doctrinally coherent, applying enhanced scrutiny to
buy-side decisions would open the door to well-documented
stockholder litigation pathologies that have undermined the
effectiveness of the sell-side regime.13 In recent years, the Delaware
courts have strived to lessen the impact of these pathologies. One
powerful intervention has been to lower the standard of review from
enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule if the transaction
receives fully informed stockholder approval.14 Logically, this
innovation also would apply to bidder fiduciaries.
It seems likely, therefore, that a principal consequence of
applying enhanced scrutiny to bidder decisions would be to induce
more buy-side stockholder votes.15 There are substantial reasons to
believe that buy-side stockholder votes would be an effective tool to
limit the bidder overpayment phenomenon.16 On balance, extending
enhanced scrutiny to decisions by buy-side fiduciaries should lead
to a superior regime in which stockholders can provide a meaningful
check on bidder overpayment.17
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the bidder
overpayment problem and the empirical explanations for
overpayment: agency costs and behavioral biases. The explanations
for overpayment highlight soft conflicts of interests and implicate
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II. A–B.
13 See infra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
14 See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015) (“[W]hen a
transaction not subject to the entire fairness standard is approved by a fully informed,
uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule applies.”).
15 See Afsharipour, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 139–142 (describing common
acquisition structures, and how bidders can avoid stockholder voting rights by using cash or
a combination of cash and stock where the stock component constitutes less than 20% of
issued and outstanding bidder shares).
16 See id. at 147–55 (addressing empirical research and arguing that the rise of
institutional investors and proxy advisory firms, coupled with the monitoring function of
voting shareholders, may effectively limit bidder overpayment).
17 See id. (concluding that arguments against bidder shareholder voting due to cost and
uncertainty are “overstated” and arguing for shareholder voting rights “in situations of high
importance to firm value and share price”).
11
12
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the role of fiduciaries. Delaware law has developed a nuanced
framework—enhanced scrutiny—for reviewing the decisions of sellside fiduciaries. In Part III we examine the development of
enhanced scrutiny in order to determine whether enhanced scrutiny
may be used to address bidder overpayment.
Part IV argues that the Delaware courts’ rationales for applying
enhanced scrutiny to the decisions of target boards in third-party
M&A transactions equally hold in the context of bidder boards. This
part then assesses both supporting and countervailing
considerations for using litigation as the solution to the fiduciary
conflicts that lead to problems on the bidder side. Over the past
several years the Delaware courts have encouraged the use of a fully
informed stockholder vote on the sell-side to lessen litigation risk in
third-party M&A transactions.
In Part V, we reason that the primary argument for extending
enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions is not that the litigation
itself will generate superior outcomes, but rather that buy-side
companies will have a greater incentive to undertake shareholder
votes on a proposed transaction. This argument builds on recent
empirical literature which finds that voting by stockholders can
provide an important counterbalance to guard against the selfinterest and biases that lead to bidder overpayment.
II. BIDDER OVERPAYMENT AND ITS CAUSES
Hewlett-Packard (HP), a Silicon Valley icon, agreed to acquire
UK software firm Autonomy for approximately $11 billion in August
2011.18 The deal was a boon for Autonomy shareholders, who
received a premium of almost 64 percent to Autonomy’s share price
at the time of announcement.19 By November 2012, HP announced
a write-down of $8.8 billion related to the Autonomy acquisition,
including a write down of $5 billion related to accounting problems

18 See James B. Stewart, From H.P., a Blunder That Seems to Beat All, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/business/hps-autonomy-blunder-might-beone-for-the-record-books.html.
19 See Michael J. de la Merced & Jeffrey Cane, Hewlett-Packard Strikes $11.7 Billion Deal;
Plans to Spin Off P.C. Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2011, 12:33 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/hewlett-packard-said-to-be-near-10-billion-dealand-p-c-spinoff/.
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at Autonomy.20 The disastrous deal destroyed billions of dollars in
value for HP shareholders, and resulted in large securities classaction suits against HP.21 While the extent of the loss suffered by
HP was a surprise, analysts had warned at the outset that the
Autonomy deal was “wildly overpriced.”22 According to reports, HP’s
zealous courtship of Autonomy was spearheaded by Léo Apotheker,
HP’s then-new chief executive officer, who was eager to use the
Autonomy acquisition to make his mark at the company.23 The
failed Autonomy deal was only one in a string of poorly performing
acquisitions—all of which were touted by a series of successive HP
CEOs as acquisitions that would “transform” the company.24
A.

BIDDER OVERPAYMENT

HP’s acquisition of Autonomy illustrates a striking pattern in
public company acquisitions. A vast body of empirical literature has
shown “that a large percentage of transactions involve negative
returns for acquirer shareholders . . . and that the losses from the
worst performing deals are very large.”25 A comprehensive review of
See Stewart, supra note 18.
See Richard Waters & Peter Campbell, HP Enterprise Seeks to End Autonomy Saga with
Software Sale, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e657857a-7113-11e6a0c9-1365ce54b926; Juliette Garside, HP to Pay $100m to Settle Autonomy Dispute, THE
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 2:02 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/09/hpautonomy-settle-lawsuit (reporting that HP would pay $100 million to settle a shareholder
lawsuit relating to the purchase of Autonomy).
22 Stewart, supra note 18.
23 See James B. Stewart, Léo Apotheker May Have Been Worse H.P. Chief Than Carly
Fiorina, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/business/leoapotheker-may-have-been-worse-hp-chief-than-carly-fiorina.html (describing Apotheker’s
lack of due diligence and assurances to board members who questioned the deal); Clive
Longbottom, HP: Where Next for the Troubled Silicon Valley Giant, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
http://computerweekly.com/feature/HP-Where-next-for-the-troubled-Silicon-Valley-giant
(stating that Apotheker “tried to make his mark on the firm through acquisition,” with
Autonomy as the largest of his deals).
24 See Longbottom, supra note 23 (listing poorly performing acquisitions by other HP
CEOs, including Carly Fiorina’s acquisition of Compaq and Mark Hurd’s acquisitions of
Peregrine Systems and Mercury Interactive); James Bandler & Doris Burke, How HewlettPackard Lost Its Way, FORTUNE (May 8, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/05/08/how-hewlettpackard-lost-its-way (describing Apotheker’s purchase of Autonomy as an effort to
“transform[]” HP into a software company and describing previous CEO Mark Hurd’s
acquisition of Palm Inc. as a major “attempt[] to fashion a growth strategy” which ultimately
did not pan out).
25 Marco Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?, 29
REV. FIN. STUDIES 3035, 3036 (2016) (citations omitted). For a summary of the research on
20
21
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the empirical literature concluded that historically, “acquisitions
did not enhance acquiring firm value, as measured by either shortterm . . . or long-term performance measures.”26
The bidder overpayment problem varies by type of bidder and the
bidding scenario. Bidder overpayment tends to be particularly acute
when public-company bidders acquire public-company targets.27
the “bidder overpayment problem,” see generally Afsharipour, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at
132–34 and Afsharipour, Put Option, supra note 1, at 1032–34. Many empirical researchers
have found that some acquisitions generate negative returns. See Gregor Andrade et al., New
Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 110–11 (2001); Christa H. S.
Bouwman et al., Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence, 22 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 633, 636 (2009); Jarrad Harford et al., The Sources of Value Destruction in
Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 247–48, 260 (2012); Tim
Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate
Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1773–89 (1997); Sara B. Moeller et al., Firm Size and the Gains
from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202, 226 (2004); Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction,
supra note 2, at 781; Gunther Tichy, What Do We Know About Success and Failure of
Mergers?, 1 J. INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE 347, 366–68 (2001). There is some evidence
that acquisition activity funded with overvalued bidder stock may benefit bidder stockholders
in the long run so long as the target firm’s stock is relatively less overvalued. See Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 301
(2003). Another study finds that “overvalued acquirers often significantly overpay for the
targets they purchase” and that such “acquisitions do not produce the necessary synergy
gains.” Fangjian Fu et al., Acquisitions Driven by Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?,
109 J. FIN. ECON. 24, 25 (2013). The authors report that “[o]vervalued acquirers incur
significantly worse stock returns during the five years following acquisitions than the control
firms that did not engage in mergers” and experience “significant deterioration in operating
performance.” Id. at 26.
26 Jerayr Haleblian et al., Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions:
A Review and Research Agenda, 35 J. MGMT. 469, 470 (2009) (citations omitted). Postacquisition, CEOs tend to exercise options and sell their stock in the acquirer, indicating that
“they do not appear to anticipate long-term value creation from their acquisitions.” Cynthia
E. Devers et al., Do They Walk the Talk? Gauging Acquiring CEO and Director Confidence in
the Value Creation Potential of Announced Acquisitions, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1679, 1679 (2013).
The verdict on bidder overpayment, however, is not unanimous. Some scholars have argued
that “the early papers which found that shareholders of acquirers earned zero or mostly
negative abnormal returns in the post-1980s period have to be reexamined” due to estimation
issues. See Darius Palia, The Market for Corporate Control: Survey of the Empirical Evidence,
Estimation Issues, and Potential Areas for Future Research, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon, eds. 2016); see also
Mark Humphery-Jenner, Ronald W. Masulis, & Peter L. Swan, Do Wealth Creating Mergers
and Acquisitions Really Hurt Bidder Shareholders? 7 (FIRN Research Paper 2517209, Feb.
14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517209 (arguing that “traditional event study
methodology fails to account for the negative information that takeover bids often release,
thereby downward biasing returns calculated using a standard event study methodology”).
27 See Sandra Betton et al., Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE:
EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 291, 407 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008) (showing that offer
premiums are greater for public bidders); accord Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction, supra
note 2, at 770–71 (“[A]cquisitions of public firms . . . lead to lower acquiring-firm abnormal
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Private acquirers tend to pay less in acquisitions than public
bidders, and private companies that make acquisitions tend to
outperform their public peers.28 There is evidence that certain serial
acquirers, such as Cisco and Berkshire Hathaway, tend to make
good acquisitions, and that an acquirer’s penchant for making good
or bad acquisitions persists across deals.29
More recently, one study questioned whether the bidder
overpayment trend holds for more recent acquisitions. The study,
which compared M&A transactions from 2009-2015 to M&A
transactions from 1990-2009, suggests that post-2009 M&A deals
created positive and significant returns for acquiring firm
shareholders.30 The authors of the study posit that the evidence of
less overpayment post the 2008 financial crisis is linked to
“improvements in the quality of corporate governance among
acquiring firms.”31
It is unclear whether these positive bidder returns will continue.
Some studies indicate that deals done during a weak economy, such
as during the recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis,
perform better than deals undertaken during a strong economy.32
One argument for why strong economy deals perform more poorly
is that when the economy is strong, managers with less discipline—
returns.”); see also Asli M. Arikan & René M. Stulz, Corporate Acquisitions, Diversification,
and the Firm’s Life Cycle, 71 J. FIN. 139, 139 (2016) (finding that stock price reaction to
acquisitions of public firms by older firms is negative). There is considerable debate in the
literature about whether cash or stock deals are better for bidder shareholders. See Haleblian
et al., supra note 26, at 479. One study concludes, however, that the “worst-case scenario” for
bidder stockholders is an all-stock acquisition of another public company. Betton et al., supra,
at 413.
28 See Andrey Golubov & Nan Xiong, Why Do Private Acquirers Outperform Public
Acquirers? 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No.
482/2016, Sept. 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834805 (reviewing 6,386 acquisitions from
1997-2010 and finding that private acquirers outperform public company acquirers in both
return on assets and in asset utilization for one, two and three years following the
acquisition); Bargeron et al., supra note 3, at 376 (finding that private firms pay lower
premiums relative to public bidders without high managerial ownership).
29 See Andrey Golubov et al., Extraordinary Acquirers, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 314, 315 (2015).
30 G. Alexandridis, N. Antypas, N. Travlos, Value Creation from M&As: New Evidence, 45
J. CORP. FIN. 632, 633 (2017).
31 Id. at 632.
32 See, e.g., Jens Kengelbach et al., As Prices Peak, Should Dealmakers Wait for the Next
Downturn, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Mar. 16, 2018), http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-AsPrices-Peak-Should-Dealmakers-Wait-for-the-Next-Downturn-Mar-2018_tcm9-186956.pdf
(analyzing “global transactions of more than $250 million from 1985 through 2014” and
finding that “weak-economy deals performed better than strong-economy deals”).
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or more self-interest—have the capability to pursue value reducing
acquisitions with little market oversight.33 Thus, it may be that
deals done post-2015, a period during which the economy has been
quite strong, will prove to have destroyed value for acquirer
shareholders.
B.

THE CAUSES OF OVERPAYMENT

One contributor to bidder overpayment is managerial agency
costs. Agency theorists in law, management, and finance argue that
agency costs explain bidder overpayment—that is management
pursues wealth-destroying acquisitions at the expense of
shareholders.34 Numerous studies provide evidence that
acquisitions offer significant benefits to bidder management—
particularly bidder CEOs—in the form of increased compensation,
power, and prestige.35 For example, studies find that acquisitions
33 Acquisitions are capital intensive transactions, and firms frequently finance a large
portion of the transaction; thus, access to credit markets, which is much more available
during a strong economy, is an important component in a firm’s ability to undertake an
acquisition. See George Alexandridis et al., Financial Hedging and Corporate Investment:
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions, EFMA 2017 Annual Conference (June 19, 2017),
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2017Athens/papers/EFMA2017_0497_fullpaper.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Black, supra note 3, at 627–28 (discussing principal-agent conflicts in
takeovers); Coffee, Regulating, supra note 3, at 1167–69, 1224–29; Ronald W. Masulis et al.,
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1852 (2007).
35 See, e.g., Soojin Yim, The Acquisitiveness of Youth: CEO Age and Acquisition Behavior,
108 J. FIN. ECON. 250, 271 (2013) (finding that acquisitions “are associated with large,
permanent increases in CEO compensation”); Fu et al., supra note 25, at 4 (finding that
“acquirer CEOs in overvaluation-driven acquisitions obtain substantial pecuniary benefits
following these transactions, specifically large new restricted stock and option grants” and
that these benefits outweigh any losses suffered from a decline in value of the CEO’s stock
holdings); Haleblian et al., supra note 26, at 475 (positing that CEO compensation is a
significant factor contributing to acquisitions and overpayment because “managing larger
firms generally also increases CEO discretion and power, which can further entrench
managers and reduce their employment risk” (citation omitted)); Jarrad Harford & Kai Li,
Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs, 62 J. FIN. 917,
918 (2007) (finding that acquiring firm CEOs are financially rewarded for acquisitions, but
are not similarly rewarded for other types of major capital expenditures; positing that “by
increasing the size of the firm and changing its scope of operations, acquisitions provide a
natural opportunity for the CEO and the board to restructure his compensation,” increasing
the ability of the CEO to advocate “for more pay and for pay that is less sensitive to
performance for the first few years of the acquisition”); Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 121 (2004)
(showing that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly
larger M&A bonuses, but these bonuses are not related to deal performance); Adam Steinbach
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“are associated with large, permanent increases in CEO
compensation.”36 Studies also find that CEOs are financially
rewarded for acquisitions in the form of large, new options and
grants, but are not similarly rewarded for other types of major
transactions.37
Other studies provide indirect support for a managerial agency
cost explanation. Using takeover defenses as a proxy for managerial
entrenchment, researchers have shown that acquirers with more
takeover defenses generate lower returns from their acquisitions
than acquirers with fewer anti-takeover devices.38 One study found
that bidders with weak governance structures tend to overpay
significantly and fail to achieve anticipated synergy gains.39
Another study found that entrenched managers disproportionately
avoid private-company targets,40 even though bidder performance
in private-company acquisitions is significantly better than public
company targets,41 arguably because the lesser prestige of a private
et al., Peering into the Executive Mind: Expanding Our Understanding of the Motives for
Acquisitions, in 15 ADVANCES IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 73 (2016) (discussing studies
finding that “CEOs who are underpaid relative to peer CEOs engage in higher levels of
acquisition activity than other CEOs, perhaps, as a means of increasing their own
compensation to better align with peers’ pay”); Jarrad Harford, Corporate Cash Reserves and
Acquisitions, 54 J. FIN. 1969, 1969 (1999) (finding that “cash-rich firms are more likely than
other firms to attempt acquisitions” and their acquisitions are more likely to be valuedecreasing); see also Richard T. Bliss & Richard J. Rosen, CEO Compensation and Bank
Mergers, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 108 (2001) (finding that CEO compensation in bank mergers
increases even if the merger causes the acquirer’s stock price to decline). But see Arikan &
Stulz, supra note 27, at 190 (finding “no support for the prediction of agency theories that
mature firms with high cash holdings but poor growth opportunities acquire more”).
36 Yim, supra note 35, at 271.
37 See Harford & Li, supra note 35, at 919 (finding that “[CEO] compensation changes
around major capital expenditures are much smaller and more sensitive to performance than
those following acquisitions”).
38 See Masulis et al., supra note 34, at 1853 (“[A]cquisition announcements made by firms
with more [takeover defenses] in place generate lower abnormal bidder returns than those
made by firms with fewer [takeover defenses], and the difference is significant both
statistically and economically.”); Harford et al., supra note 26, at 248 (“The post-merger
operating performance for acquisitions by entrenched managers is worse than for others,
suggesting that poor target selection, as opposed to simply overpaying for good targets,
explains the value destruction.”).
39 Fu et al., supra note 25, at 26.
40 See Harford et al., supra note 25, at 247–248.
41 See Fuller et al., What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms
That Make Many Acquisitions, 57 J. Fin. 1763, 1764 (2002) (“[B]idders have significantly
negative returns when buying public targets and significantly positive returns when buying
private or subsidiary targets.”).
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company target affects the acquisition decision. The same study
found that when entrenched managers buy a private target, they
are less likely to use stock, “thereby avoiding scrutiny and the
creation of a monitoring blockholder.”42
A second, complementary contributor to bidder overpayment is
behavioral bias,43 such as overconfidence and ego gratification.44
Managers may overestimate their ability to price a target accurately
or their ability to integrate its operations and generate synergies.45
They may also get caught up in the competitive dynamic of a bidding
contest, leading to the winner’s curse.46 Studies have shown that
Harford et al., supra note 25, at 260.
See supra note 4.
44 See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in
Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1354–81 (2001) (finding that impulses, overoptimism, and anchoring are psychological factors affecting mega-mergers). See generally
Steinbach et al., supra note 35, at 73 (examining the influence of individual executive
characteristics on acquisition behavior).
45 See Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 103, 103 (1997) (studying 106
large acquisitions and finding that “losses in acquiring firms’ shareholder wealth following
an acquisition and the greater the CEO hubris and acquisition premiums, the greater the
shareholder losses”); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO
Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 20, 34, 42 (2008) (reviewing a
sample of Forbes 500 firms from 1980 to 1994 using two proxies for overconfidence, and
finding “that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as
overconfident,” and that “[t]he effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not
require external financing”); Roll, supra note 4, at 199–201 (arguing that over-confident
managers tend to be overly optimistic when valuing targets and accordingly make valuedestroying acquisitions); see also Black, supra note 3, at 624 (“Managers who are successful
in one business may be especially prone to overestimate their ability to run another
business.”); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate
Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661 (2005) (“Overconfident managers overestimate the returns
to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly.”); cf. Arijit Chatterjee
& Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their
Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351, 351–52 (2007) (arguing
that narcissistic CEOs favor strategic dynamism and grandiosity, and tend to deliver extreme
and volatile performance for their organizations). Confirmation bias, in which a decisionmaker notices and emphasizes confirmatory evidence while ignoring or discounting
disconfirming evidence, is also a factor. See, e.g., Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives
Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72
J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 930, 932 (2009) (noting that confirmation bias affects merger
decisions).
46 See, e.g., Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 (2010)
(examining “when and why potentially self-damaging competitive motivations and behaviors
will emerge”); Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning Is Everything, HARV. BUS. REV., May
2008, at 78, 80 (identifying “three principal drivers of competitive arousal in business
42
43
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social factors can undermine decision making and lead to poor
acquisitions. These factors include the existence of extensive
business or educational ties between the managers of the bidder and
target firms,47 the presence of fewer independent directors on the
bidder’s board,48 and the desire to keep up with peers.49
There is reason to think that the involvement of contingently
compensated financial advisors can magnify the effects of
managerial agency costs. Like managers, financial advisors receive
outsized benefits from completing acquisitions. Investment banks
get big fees for advising companies on M&A transactions.50 Their
fees are based primarily on the size of the deal, and a significant
portion is contingent on closing.51 It is not uncommon for an advisor
settings: rivalry, time pressure, and audience scrutiny”). But see Mark Humphery-Jenner,
Ronald W. Masulis & Peter L. Swan, Do Wealth Creating Mergers and Acquisitions Really
Hurt Bidder Shareholders? 20, (FIRN Research Paper 2517209, Feb. 14, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517209 (finding that bidder stock falls in response to exogenous
bid failure, and arguing that “[i]f bids are value destroying or bidders are subject to hubris
and overpay, as is often contended, then bid failure should greatly improve bidder value, not
destroy it”).
47 See, e.g., Joy Ishii & Yuhai Xuan, Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes,
112 J. FIN. ECON. 344, 346 (2014) (studying 539 mergers between publicly-traded U.S. firms
over the period 1999 through 2007 and finding that significant social connections between
bidder and target management, derived from educational background and employment
history, are associated with lower value creation post-merger and a greater likelihood of
subsequent divestment for performance reasons).
48 See Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 45, at 117–18 (finding that the relationship
between CEO hubris and acquisition premiums is stronger when the CEO is chair of the
board and the board has a high proportion of inside directors).
49 See Wei Shi, Yan Zhang, and Robert E. Hoskisson, Ripple Effects of CEO Awards:
Investigating the Acquisition Activities of Superstar CEOs’ Competitors, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 2080, 2080 (2017) (finding that “CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in
the period after their competitors won CEO awards . . . compared to the pre-award period”
and that acquisitions during the post-award period “realize lower announcement returns
compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the pre-award period”); James D. Westphal,
Marc-David L. Seidel & Katherine J. Stewart, Second-Order Imitation: Uncovering Latent
Effects of Board Network Ties, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 717, 723–724 (2001) (finding that firms tend
to mimic the acquisition behavior of firms that they are connected to through interlocking
directorships); Haleblian et al., supra note 26, at 477 (discussing similar research).
50 See Robyn M. McLaughlin, Investment-Banking Contracts in Tender Offers, 28 J. FIN.
ECON. 209, 209 (1990) (finding that “investment-banker advisory fees in tender offers average
1.29% of the value of a completed transaction”). For investment banks, M&A advisory fees
are as important as equity underwriting fees. Mine Ertugrul & Karthik Krishnan, Investment
Banks in Dual Roles: Acquirer M&A Advisors as Underwriters, 37 J. FIN. RESEARCH 159, 159
(2014); Andrey Golubov et al., When it Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence
About the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As, 67 J. FIN. 271, 288 (2012).
51 See Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1079,
1097–1098 (2016) (“[F]ees are typically calculated as a percentage of the deal consideration,
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to earn tens of millions of dollars for a single transaction, as long as
the transaction closes.52 Advisors also gain prestige from working
on successful deals, as measured by their ranking on the “league
tables.”53
There is also reason to think that deal advisors may reinforce the
effects of behavioral bias. Advisors are “at the forefront of the
negotiations and decision-making process.”54 Advisors have “close
and frequent” contact with management and will be “brought into
the client’s inner sanctum, becoming privy to managers’
confidences.”55 If management wants to complete a deal, then a close
relationship between management and the financial advisors may
lead the advisor to shade its advice in favor of the transaction in
order to “avoid displeasing management.”56 This channel may
extend to valuation advice, including fairness opinions.57 Empirical
evidence indicates that bidders who obtain fairness opinions
underperform in the short term, suggesting that the bankers may
be overvaluing the target to help get the deal closed.58

often between 0.5% and 1.0%, contingent on the contemplated deal closing.” (citation
omitted)).
52 Id. at 1097.
53 Golubov et al., supra note 50, at 277. Similar incentives apply to deal lawyers. See
C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and Acquisition
Outcomes, 56 J. L. & ECON. 189, 220 (2013) (finding that top-tier bidder law firms, as
measured by appearance on league tables, are associated with higher rates of deal completion
and higher takeover premia than less prestigious law firms; positing that “top bidder law
firms have stronger incentives and abilities than less prominent law firms to successfully
complete M&A offers even at the cost of higher takeover premia”).
54 JOSHUA ROSENBAUM & JOSHUA PEARL, INVESTMENT BANKING: VALUATION, LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS, AND MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 331 (University 2d ed. 2013).
55 Tuch, supra note 51, at 1095–1096.
56 Tamar Frankel, The Influence of Investment Banks on Corporate Governance 357–358,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 357-58 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell, eds., 2012); see also Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 1557, 1587 (2006) (describing the close relationship between investment banking
financial managers and corporate management).
57 See Davidoff, supra note 56, at 1586–87 (noting that conflicts may arise for financial
advisors because compensation for fairness opinions are dependent upon a transaction’s
occurrence); see also Anup Agrawal et al., Common Advisers in Mergers and Acquisitions:
Determinants and Consequences, 56 J.L. & ECON. 691, 692 (2013) (stating that advisors have
an incentive to complete deals, which can cause “quality to take a back seat”).
58 Joan MacLeod Heminway, A More Critical Use of Fairness Opinions as a Practical
Approach to the Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN.
J. BUS. L. 81, 85 (2011).
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III. ENHANCED SCRUTINY AS A POSSIBLE RESPONSE
In corporate law, agency costs and behavioral biases map onto
the law of fiduciary duties. The buy-side directors and officers who
confront conflicts of interest and labor under subtle behavioral
biases are fiduciaries who owe duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation and its stockholders.59 As the beneficiaries of those
duties, stockholders can bring litigation challenging whether
directors have complied with their fiduciary obligations. Delaware
law has developed a nuanced framework for reviewing the decisions
of sell-side fiduciaries, and that framework has implications for
judicial review of buy-side decision-making.
A. ENHANCED SCRUTINY AS AN INTERMEDIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a series of landmark decisions issued during the 1980s and
early 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court first created and then
developed an intermediate standard of review that stood in between
the deferential business judgment rule and the intrusive entire
fairness test.60 In each case, the Delaware Supreme Court
confronted a scenario where the contextual realities raised
questions about the motives of even independent and disinterested
59 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(describing corporate directors as fiduciaries who owe duties of care and loyalty); accord Polk
v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing their duties the directors owe
fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.”); Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“[D]irectors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.”). The Delaware
Supreme Court has held that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors.
See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). For simplicity, this discussion
speaks in terms of directors, but the analysis applies equally to the duties owed by officers.
It bears noting that “[o]fficers also are agents who report to the board of directors in its
capacity as the governing body of the corporation” and who therefore owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders under agency law. Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 780–81
(Del. Ch. 2016). This article does not explore the potentially different implications of the
officers’ agency-based duties.
60 Many commentators have made this observation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 769, 796 (2006)
(describing Delaware Supreme Court's creation of an intermediate standard of review
between the entire fairness and business judgment rule standards); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal
Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 491, 496 (2001)
(explaining that to address the subtle conflicts created by a hostile takeover, “the Delaware
Supreme Court chose the middle ground that had been championed by no one. The court
unveiled an intermediate standard of review, somewhere between the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty”).
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directors.61 The situations did not involve the traditional conflicts of
interest that corporate law historically had addressed, such as selfdealing, material financial entanglements, or fealty to an interested
party. Yet the divergent incentives that arose in these situations did
not comfortably permit deferring fully to the directors’ judgment as
if they were independent and disinterested.62
Each time the Delaware Supreme Court confronted one of the
scenarios, it responded with a two-part test containing the same
core elements. The first step involved examining the directors’
motives to determine whether they had acted for a legitimate
corporate purpose after conducting a reasonable investigation. The
second step involved evaluating the means the directors chose to
achieve their purpose to determine whether it fell within a range of
reasonable approaches. For both steps, the Delaware Supreme
Court placed the burden of proof on the directors, because the
confidence-undermining dynamics of the situation created the
potential for a loyalty breach. The result was an intermediate
standard of review that was more intrusive than the presumptions
of the business judgment rule and the rationality standard that it
deployed, yet more deferential than the fairness rubric of the entire
fairness test.63
61 See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
(“[T]here are rare situations which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role
in overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by directors. In these situations, a court
subjects the directors’ conduct to enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.”); Gilbert
v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) (linking the application of enhanced scrutiny
to situations in which the board has taken debatable action that carries the “potential for
conflict and fiduciary misconduct”); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d
914, 928 (Del. 2003) (“The prior decisions of this Court have identified the circumstances
where board action must be subjected to enhanced judicial scrutiny . . . .”).
62 See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing the
concerns that animated the Delaware Supreme Court’s foundational enhanced scrutiny
decisions; explaining that the Delaware Supreme Court “[a]void[ed] a crude bifurcation of the
world into two starkly divergent categories—business judgment rule review reflecting a
policy of maximal deference to disinterested board decisionmaking and entire fairness review
reflecting a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing decisions” and instead “adopted
a middle ground” to address these scenarios); see also Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, No. Civ.A.
16301, 1998 WL 892631, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998) (locating enhanced scrutiny under
Unocal and Revlon between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test).
63 See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598 (“In that middle ground [of enhanced scrutiny], the
reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the board’s actions under a
standard that is more stringent than business judgment review and yet less severe than the
entire fairness standard. Moreover, the defendants themselves are allocated the burden to
show that they acted reasonably.” (footnotes omitted)).
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The bulk of the Delaware Supreme Court’s generative work on
the intermediate standard took place between 1981 and 1995. It
started with Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado, a path-breaking
ruling which created a two-step standard for reviewing a special
litigation committee’s decision to dismiss a derivative action.64
Because of potential affinities among directors and the concern that
“a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might not play a
role,”65 the Delaware Supreme Court placed the burden on the
special litigation committee to prove that its members acted
independently and in good faith, had conducted “a reasonable
investigation,”66 and had identified “reasonable bases for good faith
findings and recommendations.”67 At that point, the trial court could
proceed “in its discretion, to the next step[,]” in which the trial court
could “determine, applying its own independent business judgment,
whether the motion should be granted.”68 The Zapata test provoked
an uproar and was roundly criticized for departing from the
traditional business judgment rule.69 With the benefit of hindsight,

430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 787.
66 Id. at 788.
67 Id. at 789.
68 Id. Some have been critical of the concept of a judge’s “independent business judgment.”
See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del. Ch. 2003) (describing
the standard as “oxymoronic”). Regarded more charitably, the thrust of the second prong of
Zapata is not for the court to make a de novo assessment, but rather to determine whether
the directors reached a reasonable outcome, an analysis that tracks the second prong of
enhanced scrutiny. See Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., No. Civ. A. 13950,
1997 WL 305829, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (“[T]he second prong of the Zapata test
requires that this court exercise its own business judgment with respect to the reasonableness
of the settlement”); see also Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co. (U.S.), Inc., C.A. No. 1091-VCL,
2013 WL 458373, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (discussing range of reasonableness inquiry);
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of
Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1360 (2005) (“[T]he court’s review, as
contemplated [by Zapata], is of the reasonableness of the [special litigation committee’s]
business judgment rather than the substitution of its own.”).
69 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 647–48 (1986) (describing contretemps
over Zapata); Irwin Borowski, Corporate Accountability: The Role of the Independent Director,
9 J. CORP. L. 455, 466 (1984) (“In 1981, however, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, surprised almost everybody by requiring an independent judicial review
in which the court applies its own independent business judgment to the allegations in order
to determine whether the suit should be allowed to continue. The Zapata decision aroused a
storm of controversy with numerous articles being written in its aftermath.” (footnotes
omitted)).
64
65
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the Zapata two-step analysis is now easily recognizable as a nascent
version of enhanced scrutiny.70
Then came the “watershed year”71 of 1985, when the Delaware
Supreme Court formally created the intermediate standard of
review in the iconic Unocal decision.72 The court promptly applied
the new standard in Moran,73 which validated the adoption of a
stockholder-rights plan as an anticipatory defensive measure. The
court also extended the new standard to the sale of a corporation in
Revlon.74 These decisions followed the judicial bombshell of Van

70 See Obeid v. Hogan, C.A. No. 11900-VCL, 2016 WL 3356851, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 10,
2016) (“With the benefit of hindsight, one can discern in Zapata the foundational concepts
that animate enhanced scrutiny, the intermediate standard of review that the Delaware
Supreme Court introduced openly some four years later in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).”); In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig.,
C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *27 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (describing Zapata as
having adopted “a test which marked the Delaware Supreme Court's first deployment of
something akin to the two-step standard of review that later emerged as enhanced scrutiny”);
La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., C.A. No. 5682-VCL, 2011 WL
773316, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (“[A special litigation committee’s] decision to dismiss a
post-demand-excusal derivative claim is reviewed under Zapata's two-step standard, which
effectively amounts to reasonableness review and a context-specific application of enhanced
scrutiny.”); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 821, 851 (2004) (concluding that “Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal”); Gregory V.
Varallo, et al., From Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice,
53 BUS. LAW. 397, 423 n.121 (1998) (“The [Zapata] standard is also reminiscent of the
enhanced scrutiny courts use to examine the actions of directors engaged in a sale of a
corporation or other like transactions . . . . Perhaps the similarity . . . is best explained by the
fact that in all of these situations courts would like to defer to the business judgment of a
board, but because the scenarios in which these cases arise create a potential conflict of
interest for board members, the court is only willing to do so if a board first demonstrates it
is capable of making an independent business judgment and the judgment seems at least to
make some rational sense.”).
71 E. Norman Veasey, Book Review, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 573, 576 (1990) (reviewing DENNIS
J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1989)); accord E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New
Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1447 (2004) (“The watershed year of 1985, featuring
Smith v. Van Gorkom, Unocal, Moran v. Household, and Revlon, was indeed a time when
many of the rules of the road did change in the context of mergers and acquisitions.” (citations
omitted)). The four written opinions were issued during a fourteen-month period between
January 1985 and March 1986. But while the Delaware Supreme Court published the written
decision in Revlon on March 13, 1986, outside the calendar year, the high court issued its
injunction ruling orally from the bench on November 1, 1985, within the watershed. Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
72 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
73 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
74 Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
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Gorkom,75 which kicked off the watershed year by holding directors
personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties when selling a
corporation for cash in a single-bidder process that the court deemed
inadequate. Van Gorkom did not openly apply the new intermediate
standard—it would not be created until five months later in Unocal.
Only later did a consensus emerge that Van Gorkom was a protoenhanced-scrutiny case that applied the intermediate standard,
albeit without saying so.76
Over the next decade, Delaware’s enhanced scrutiny
jurisprudence grew vigorously—though not always consistently—as
the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
applied the precedents from the watershed year to diverse fact
patterns involving third-party M&A scenarios.77 For multiple
75 Smith v.Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
76 See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 602 (“Van Gorkom, after all, was really a Revlon case.”
(footnotes omitted)); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“I count [Van Gorkom] not as a ‘negligence’ or due care case involving no loyalty issues but
as an early and, as of its date, not yet fully rationalized, ‘Revlon’ or ‘change in control’ case.”);
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of
Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as
a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 459 n.39 (2002) (“Van Gorkom . . . must
also be viewed as part of the Delaware courts’ effort to grapple with the huge increase in
mergers and acquisition activity in [the] 1980s and the new problems that posed for judicial
review of director conduct.”); William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of
Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 325 (Klaus
J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“In retrospect, [Van Gorkom] can be best rationalized not as a
standard duty of care case, but as the first case in which the Delaware Supreme Court began
to work out its new takeover jurisprudence.”); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521,
522 (2002) (“Van Gorkom should be seen not as a business judgment rule case but as a
takeover case that was the harbinger of the then newly emerging Delaware jurisprudence on
friendly and hostile takeovers, which included the almost contemporaneous Unocal and
Revlon decisions.” (footnote omitted)); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union
Reconsidered, 98 YALE L. J. 127, 128 (1988) (“Trans Union is not, at bottom, a business
judgment case. It is a takeover case.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2002) (interpreting “the
oft-maligned decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom” as addressing a breakdown in the group
decision-making process in which the board “blindly relied on Van Gorkom’s assertion,”
thereby enabling Van Gorkom to not disclose and the board to not discover “key facts
suggesting that the deal was not as attractive as it seemed on first look”).
77 The reference to third-party M&A scenarios encompasses transactions negotiated at
arms’ length, or a board’s arms’ length resistance to a hostile bid. It excludes scenarios where
the counterparty is a controlling stockholder, or where a majority of the directors have a
traditional conflict of interest resulting from direct transaction-related benefits. The latter
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reasons, including the novelty of the new intermediate standard and
the fact that each of the foundational cases necessarily dealt with a
unique fact scenario, real-time observers frequently interpreted the
core decisions as creating distinct and unrelated standards of
review. The decisions in Unocal and Revlon, for example, were
perceived frequently as establishing separate doctrines, with the
latter imposing affirmative conduct obligations on directors.78
By 1995, however, the tide of jurisprudential innovation began to
ebb. The high-water mark was the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1994
opinion in QVC,79 which countered a largely restrictive ruling in
Time-Warner80 by restoring enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock
mergers involving a change of control. During the ensuing nineteen
years that preceded recent wholesale changes in the composition of
the Delaware Supreme Court,81 the Delaware Supreme Court
two transactional categories had long been governed by the entire fairness test, and during
the fertile period when the Delaware courts developed the intermediate standard of enhanced
scrutiny, the application of the entire fairness standard to controller transactions remained
relatively non-controversial and stable. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del.
1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The principal doctrinal
development for controlling stockholder transactions took place in the mid-1990s, when the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the threat of inherent coercion created by the presence of
a controlling stockholder meant that the use of a special committee of independent directors
was not sufficient to restore business judgment review. See generally Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,
694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
Recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions exhibit considerable development in this area. See
In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015) (holding that
the presence of controller and the threat of inherent coercion are insufficient to call into
question independence and disinterestedness of a director for purposes of pleading a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty that would overcome exculpation under 8 Del. Code Ann. §
102(b)(7) (2015)); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (holding that use
of both a special committee and a majority-of-the-minority vote ab initio are sufficient to
negate the threat of inherent coercion and cause the operative standard of review to be the
business judgment rule).
78 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 802 (“[F]or many, the differences between Unocal and
Revlon loomed large.” (citation omitted)); Ross W. Wooten, Comment, Restructurings During
A Hostile Takeover: Directors’ Discretion or Shareholders’ Choice?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 505, 519
(1998) (“It is apparent that there are two standards . . . .”); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the
Law of Hostile Takeovers: The Impact of QVC and Its Progeny, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 945, 962
(1995) (“[T]here is much practical difference between the Unocal and Revlon modes of
analysis.”).
79 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
80 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner), 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
81 Between 2014 and 2017, the entire composition of the five-member Delaware Supreme
Court turned over. See Historical List of Delaware Supreme Court Justices (1951 to Present),
Delaware Courts, http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/hisort/justiceslist.aspx (last visited
Sept. 27, 2018) (listing the tenure, names and roles of Delaware Supreme Court judges). The
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issued relatively few enhanced scrutiny opinions.82 The initial
decisions during the interregnum focused on refining existing
doctrine.83 With perhaps the exception of MM Companies, Inc. and
Omnicare, Inc.,84 the later decisions made only interstitial or liminal
changes included the elevation to Chief Justice of the Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., a longtime
member of the Court of Chancery and leading voice on that court. Id. By contrast, between
2004 and 2012, no changes took place in the high court’s membership, and from 1995 until
2004, only four changes took place. Id.
82 A Westlaw search for Delaware Supreme Court decisions that mention Unocal or Revlon
generates a total of 34 decisions during the 19 years between 1995 and 2014, or 1.8 per year.
Most of the decisions only mention Unocal or Revlon in passing; a much smaller number
engage with the doctrinal issues (admittedly this is a subjective assessment). Since 2014, the
Delaware Supreme Court has issued 11 decisions that mention Unocal or Revlon, or nearly
3.7 per year. Several have had significant implications for enhanced scrutiny doctrine. See
Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–53 (Del. 2016) (holding that after a fully informed,
non-coerced stockholder vote lowers the standard of review from enhanced scrutiny to the
business judgment rule, a plaintiff cannot seek to rebut the business judgment rule using
issues that were disclosed to stockholders, and that a claim for waste is not viable because
stockholder approval demonstrates that the transaction could be considered beneficial);
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308 (Del. 2015) (holding a fully informed,
non-coerced stockholder vote lowers the standard of review from enhanced scrutiny to the
business judgment rule); C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’
Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1067–68, 1071–72 (Del. 2014) (reversing issuance of preliminary
injunction; finding management-led, single-bidder strategy to be reasonable under enhanced
scrutiny; rejecting use of targeted injunctive relief to address breaches of fiduciary duty and
requiring that any injunction block the transaction as a whole; prioritizing contract claims of
acquirer). A similarly recent high court decision addressing the implications of controllerlevel conflicts for purposes of exculpation has logical implications for enhanced scrutiny as
well, which addresses less substantial, more subtle conflicts. See Cornerstone Therapeutics,
115 A.3d at 1184–87 and supra note 77.
83 See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (formalizing
situational triggers for enhanced scrutiny under Revlon as “(1) when a corporation initiates
an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving
a clear break-up of the company;” (2)“where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons
its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the
company,” or (3) “when approval of a transaction results in a sale or change of control”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1367 (Del. 1995) (modifying reasonableness aspect of enhanced scrutiny under Unocal to
include the range-of-reasonableness concept from QVC and to specify that reasonable
defensive measures could not be preclusive or coercive); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., 650
A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994) (same).
84 From a doctrinal standpoint, the principal exception is MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid
Audio, Inc., which expounded on the application of enhanced scrutiny to voting issues. 813
A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003). Reasonable minds can disagree about Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). Technically that decision was limited and
incremental in that it (i) reaffirmed the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Time-Warner
that enhanced scrutiny applied to defensive measures in a merger agreement, even if the
merger itself was not subject to enhanced scrutiny, and (ii) held that a combination of
defensive measures failed enhanced scrutiny by rendering the transaction preclusive. Id.
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refinements.85 After an extended bull market in judicial creativity
and doctrinal innovation, a fallow period was perhaps both expected
and welcome.
The Delaware courts’ major achievement during the fallow
period was to break down the seemingly artificial barriers between
the initially divergent strains of enhanced scrutiny. The Delaware
Supreme Court reiterated that Revlon did not impose conduct
obligations on directors,86 and a series of Court of Chancery
decisions, primarily authored by Chief Justice Strine during his
Many commentators, however, consider the decision’s analysis, particularly on the latter
issue, to have gone well beyond prior doctrine. A smaller group of commentators have argued
that the widespread criticism of Omnicare, although valid in some respects, became selfreinforcing and overwrought, such that the resulting clamor drowned out conceptually sound
and doctrinally helpful features of the decision. See generally Megan Wischmeier Shaner,
How “Bad Law, Bad Economics and Bad Policy” Positively Shaped Corporate Behavior, 47
AKRON L. REV. 753 (2014) (collecting criticisms of Omnicare, showing that the predicted
negative consequences have not come to pass, and identifying positive features of decision);
Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does Its Status 10 Years Later Tell
Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. 865, 889 (2013) (arguing that the decision made positive contributions
including (i) establishing that enhanced scrutiny applies to defensive measures in stock-forstock merger agreements and (ii) reinforcing the need for boards to be active and involved in
merger transactions); J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 796
(2013) (arguing that “like people, problems, and broken hearts, Omnicare isn’t all bad” and
that “[a]lthough saying anything good about Omnicare smacks of heresy, four aspects of the
decision deserve positive reinforcement”); Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules
for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 885 (2007) (arguing that regardless of theoretical and
doctrinal weaknesses in its decision, Omnicare reached the right policy result by limiting
fully locked-up transactions).
85 See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010) (holding that a
defensive measure is preclusive for purposes of enhanced scrutiny if it makes success
“realistically unattainable” and that standard did not require “mathematical impossibility”
(citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387)); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281,
1291–92 (Del. 1998) (applying Moran to affirm injunction against rights plan with deferred
redemption feature); cf. Black v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 872 A.2d 559, 567–68 n.16 (Del. 2005)
(affirming Court of Chancery judgment on limited grounds; cautioning that “our upholding
the adoption of the Rights Plan should be understood as limited to the specific, rather
extreme, circumstances of this case” and “should not be viewed as creating any broad
exception to the transaction paradigm in which rights plans are normally designed to operate:
settings involving a change of control transaction at the level of the corporate entity whose
board of directors adopts the rights plan”).
86 See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“No court can tell
directors exactly how to accomplish [the goal of obtaining the best value reasonably
available], because they will be facing a unique combination of circumstances, many of which
will be outside their control.”); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)
(“[T]here is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties.”); Macmillan, 559
A.2d at 1286 (“Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction according to
some standard formula . . . .”).
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tenure on the court, explained that Revlon operates as a form of
reasonableness review, i.e., a manifestation of enhanced scrutiny.87
The reconstituted Delaware Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice
Strine, has continued to describe Revlon in these terms.88
Perhaps most importantly, during his time on the Court of
Chancery, Chief Justice Strine laid the analytical groundwork for
understanding enhanced scrutiny as a single, intermediate
standard of review. This standard applies “when there is a basis for
concern that directors without a pure self-dealing motive might be
influenced by considerations other than the best interests of the
corporation and other stockholders.”89 Because of the subtle

87 See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96 (“[A]lthough the level of judicial scrutiny under
Revlon is more exacting than the deferential rationality standard applicable to run-of-themill decisions governed by the business judgment rule, at bottom Revlon is a test of
reasonableness; directors are generally free to select the path to value maximization, so long
as they choose a reasonable route to get there.” (footnote omitted)); In re Netsmart Techs.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“What is important and different
about the Revlon standard is the intensity of judicial review that is applied to the directors'
conduct. Unlike the bare rationality standard applicable to garden-variety decisions subject
to the business judgment rule, the Revlon standard contemplates a judicial examination of
the reasonableness of the board's decision-making process.”); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S'holder
Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[In Revlon,] the Supreme Court held that courts
would subject directors . . . to a heightened standard of reasonableness review, rather than
the laxer standard of rationality review applicable under the business judgment rule.”); see
generally J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why It's True and What It Means,
19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2013) (collecting authorities).
88 See RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 849 (Del. 2015) (“Revlon
‘requires us to examine whether a board’s overall course of action was reasonable under the
circumstances as a good faith attempt to secure the highest value reasonably attainable.’”
(quoting C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1066 (Del. 2014))).
89 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599 n.181 (citation omitted). The Delaware Supreme Court
has not yet gone so far as to say openly that there is a single, intermediate standard of
enhanced scrutiny, but it has come close. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in QVC can
be viewed as a step towards a unified intermediate standard of review. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and
Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1612
(1994). This interpretation of QVC becomes more powerful when that decision is considered
in conjunction with Unitrin, a case from one year later. The two decisions use virtually
identical language and concepts, even though QVC was indisputably a so-called Revlon case
and Unitrin was indisputably a so-called Unocal case. More recently, the Delaware Supreme
Court discussed enhanced scrutiny as a single, intermediate standard of review in Omnicare.
See 818 A.2d at 928 (describing “enhanced judicial scrutiny” as a standard of review triggered
by specific circumstances identified by “prior decisions of this Court”); id. at 931 (describing
“Enhanced Scrutiny Generally” and drawing on QVC and Untirin to formulate a generalized
two-part test). The popular sentiment against finding anything of value in Omnicare, which
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conflicts inherent in these scenarios, the directors’ motivations
become ambiguous. A course of action such as adopting a
stockholder rights plan, could have been taken in good faith for the
loyal purpose of advancing stockholder interests, or the same course
of action could have been pursued—consciously or subconsciously—
because of the directors’ personal interests or for other confounding
reasons.
Consequently, “there is a predicate question that must be
answered that is not typically at issue in a case governed by the
business judgment rule.”90 When the business judgment rule
applies, the board is presumed to be disinterested “and thus has no
apparent motive to do anything other than act in the best interests
of the corporation and its stockholders.”91 But in a situation where
enhanced scrutiny applies, the predicate question of what the
board’s true motivation was comes into play, and “[t]he court must
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal
interests short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board.”92 The
resulting concern about the directors’ motives is addressed “by
requiring that the directors demonstrate that their decision was
well-motivated and was a reasonable way to advance the proper
interests they must serve, which are the best interests of the
corporation and the stockholders.”93
The court carries out the necessary analysis in two steps. Framed
generally, the first step requires that that the defendant fiduciaries
“bear the burden of persuasion to show that their motivations were
proper and not selfish.”94 Put differently, “the directors must at a
minimum convince the court that they have not acted for an
admittedly is not a perfect decision, appears to have foreclosed recognition of this doctrinally
positive step. See Laster supra note 84, at 796.
90 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598.
91 Id.
92 Id.; accord Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 807 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Unocal,
when applied faithfully, . . . requires directors to convince the court that their actions are
motivated by a good faith concern for the stockholders’ best interests, and not by a desire to
entrench or enrich themselves.”); id. (explaining that Unocal analysis “subsumes the question
of loyalty that pervades all fiduciary duty cases, which is whether the directors have acted
for proper reasons”).
93 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599 n.181; accord Mercier, 929 A.2d at 807 (“The core of
Unocal’s utility really rests in the burden it asserts on directors to: (1) identify the proper
corporate objectives served by their actions; and (2) justify their actions as reasonable in
relationship to those objectives.”).
94 Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810.
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inequitable purpose” by persuading the court that “their actions are
motivated by a good faith concern for the stockholders’ best
interests, and not by a desire to entrench or enrich themselves.”95
During the first phase of an enhanced scrutiny analysis, the court
examines the evidence surrounding the reasons that the directors’
identified contemporaneously for taking action. The court assesses
whether the proffered reasons were legitimate.96 The court also
evaluates whether the directors have shown that the grounds they
identified had an adequate foundation and reflected their actual
motives.97
The second step requires that the defendant fiduciaries show
that “their actions were reasonable in relation to their legitimate
objective.”98 During the second phase, the court examines the fit
between the purposes that the directors identified and the means
they selected.99 The reasonableness test supplies an objective
standard, but not one that contemplates a single, “reasonable”
answer. Rather, a court determines whether the challenged

Id. at 807.
See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (describing the first step of enhanced scrutiny as requiring “a
judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decisonmaking process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based their decision”); Macmillan,
559 A.2d 1261 at 1288 (holding that where a board has “treated one or more of the respective
bidders on unequal terms,” enhanced scrutiny applies, and the directors must show in the
first step that they “properly perceived that shareholder interests were enhanced” by
disparate treatment); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (describing the first step of enhanced scrutiny
as requiring that the board demonstrate “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed”).
97 See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 807 (explaining that enhanced scrutiny “is useful in exposing
pre-textual justifications” and by requiring the party exercising authority to justify its
actions, “flimsy pretense stands a greater chance of being revealed” (footnotes omitted));
Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 1987) (conducting Unocal enhanced scrutiny analysis and rejecting a board’s proffered
justification as pretextual).
98 Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810.
99 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (describing the second step of enhanced scrutiny as requiring
“a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the
circumstances then existing”); Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288 (holding that where a board has
“treated one or more of the respective bidders on unequal terms,” enhanced scrutiny applies,
and the directors must show in the second step that “the board’s action [was] reasonable in
relation to the advantage sought to be achieved” by the disparate treatment); Unocal, 493
A.2d at 955 (describing the second step of enhanced scrutiny as requiring that the board
demonstrate that they adopted a response to an identified takeover threat that was
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed”).
95
96
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corporate decision falls within a reasonable range of objectively
constrained discretion:
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable
decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one
of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not
second-guess that choice even though it might have
decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast
doubt on the board’s determination. Thus, courts will
not substitute their business judgment for that of the
directors, but will determine if the directors’ decision
was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.100
The question is not whether the board made a decision which,
with the benefit of hindsight, appears optimal, but rather whether
the approach that the board selected “was itself a reasonable choice
that a loyal and careful board could adopt in the circumstances.”101
Actions that coerce stockholders or which preclude any alternative
other than the board-favored option fall outside the range of
reasonableness.102
Through this two-step examination, the court evaluates whether
the board took “a logical and reasoned approach for the purpose of
advancing a proper objective, and to thereby smoke out mere
pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions.”103 The
enhanced scrutiny standard thus “requires the court to consider for
itself whether the board is truly well motivated (i.e., is it acting for
the proper ends?) before ultimately determining whether its means
QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis removed).
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598-99; see also In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94,
115 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The duty to act reasonably is just that, a duty to take a reasonable
course of action under the circumstances presented.” (footnote omitted)).
102 See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 808 (explaining that the concepts of preclusion and coercion
are “useful considerations” for evaluating defensive responses to a takeover bid, protective
provisions in a merger agreement, and “director actions influencing the conduct of elections”).
103 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598; accord Mercier, 929 A.2d at 807 (explaining that
enhanced scrutiny is “useful in exposing pre-textual justifications”); see In re Topps Co.
S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Although Shorin and the other defendants
claim that they truly desire to get . . . a topping bid from Upper Deck that they can accept,
their behavior belies those protestations.”); id. (“The Topps board’s negotiation posture and
factual misrepresentations are more redolent of pretext, than of a sincere desire to comply
with their Revlon duties.”).
100
101
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were themselves a reasonable way of advancing those ends.”104
Conceived in this fashion, enhanced scrutiny is “reminiscent of some
federal Constitutional standards of review, which smoke out the
actual objective supposedly motivating challenged governmental
action and require a fit (of looser or tighter nature) between that
objective and the means used.”105 “Because there is a burden on the
party in power to identify its legitimate objectives and to explain its
actions as necessary to advance those object[ives], flimsy pretense
stands a greater chance of being revealed.”106
Because the enhanced scrutiny test is ultimately a means of
screening for improperly motivated actions, the outcome of the
analysis depends heavily on whether the inquiry reveals that a
conflicting interest in fact influenced the board’s decision. “As one
would expect, when the record reveals no basis to question the
board’s good faith desire to attain the proper end, the court will be
more likely to defer to the board’s [business] judgment about the
means to get there.”107
B. ENHANCED SCRUTINY FOR SELL-SIDE M&A TRANSACTIONS

Enhanced scrutiny can now be described generally as an
intermediate standard of review that applies in “specific, recurring,
and readily identifiable situations involving potential conflicts of
interest where the realities of the decision making context can
subtly undermine the decisions of even independent and
disinterested directors.”108 To date, the Delaware Supreme Court
has recognized a limited number of specific scenarios in which
unilateral board action warrants the application of enhanced
scrutiny: (i) resistance to a takeover109—whether during an actual
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599–600.
Mercier, 929 A.2d at 807 (citation omitted).
106 Id. (citation omitted).
107 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 600; accord id. at 602 (“The defendants have convinced me
that the entire Board was subjectively well motivated and exercised due care. Even in the
realm of heightened scrutiny, judicial (law-trained) second guessing of the means chosen by
such a (business-experienced) board to maximize value should, one would think, be rare.”).
108 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013); accord Reis v. Hazelett
Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Enhanced scrutiny applies when the
realities of the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions of even
independent and disinterested directors.”).
109 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (inventing the enhanced scrutiny standard because when
taking defensive action in response to a hostile tender offer, there is an “omnipresent specter
104
105
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takeover battle or through the advanced implementation of
defensive measures;110 (ii) intervention in an electoral contest for
directors or a vote with implications for corporate control;111 (iii)
taking over and addressing validly initiated derivative litigation;112
and (iv) certain sell-side M&A scenarios.113
For purposes of this article, the application of enhanced scrutiny
to certain sell-side M&A scenarios is the most relevant.
Unfortunately, the development of enhanced scrutiny in this setting
has not been a model of clarity, and the doctrine’s ebbs and flows
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders”); accord Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992) (“Unocal
recognized that directors are often faced with an ‘inherent conflict of interest’ during contests
for corporate control ‘[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders . . .
.’” (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954) (alteration in original))); see Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 928
(“The prior decisions of this Court have identified the circumstances where board action must
be subjected to enhanced judicial scrutiny . . . . One of those circumstances was described in
Unocal: when a board adopts defensive measures in response to a hostile takeover proposal .
. . .”).
110 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 n.18 (Del. 1996) (“The fact that no company
or person has commenced a specific takeover threat or action at the time of the defensive
measure’s adoption does not preclude application of the Unocal analysis if it is otherwise
applicable.”); Stroud, 606 A.2d at 82 (“The scrutiny of Unocal is not limited to the adoption of
a defensive measure during a hostile contest for control” and also applies to “a preemptive
defensive measure” when the corporation is “not under immediate attack.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350 (applying enhanced scrutiny
to “a defensive mechanism adopted to ward off possible future advances and not . . . in reaction
to a specific threat”); see also Omnicare, A.2d 914 at 928 (“In Moran v. Household, we
explained why a Unocal analysis also was applied to the adoption of a stockholder’s rights
plan, even in the absence of an immediate threat.”).
111 See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 811 (explaining that when there is director conduct “affecting
either an election of directors or a vote touching on matters of corporate control,” the board
must justify its action under the enhanced scrutiny test (citation omitted)); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999)
(explaining that courts applied enhanced scrutiny to director electoral contests because “the
board's duty of loyalty was not necessarily implicated in the traditional sense of self-dealing,
but the potential for entrenchment in the face of a hostile acquisition—the type of situation
also implicating the Unocal standard of intermediate review—did arise”); Aprahamian v.
HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987) (explaining that a “candidate for office,
whether as an elected official or as a director of a corporation,” has a conflict of interest in the
election because the candidate “is likely to prefer to be elected rather than defeated” and
“therefore has a personal interest in the outcome of the election even if the interest is not
financial and he seeks to serve from the best of motives”).
112 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981).
113 See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 812 (“For nearly a quarter of a century, Delaware law has
subjected directors to reasonableness review as to much of their conduct in the M&A
context.”).
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continue to resonate today. As a result, enhanced scrutiny currently
does not apply to all third-party sell-side M&A scenarios. It clearly
applies to a merger in which stockholders receive cash114 or where
the consideration consists of stock in a company with a controlling
stockholder.115 It does not currently apply to stock-for-stock mergers
between widely traded public companies,116 although it does apply
to defensive provisions included in the merger agreements that
govern those transactions.117
Despite this patchwork quilt of coverage, the reasons enhanced
scrutiny applies in this setting are now relatively clear, once again
largely due to an analytical foundation established by Chief Justice
Strine during his tenure on the Court of Chancery. Put simply, as
then-Chancellor Strine explained in his El Paso decision, “the
potential sale of a corporation has enormous implications for
corporate managers and advisors, and a range of human
114 See Topps, 926 A.2d at 64 (noting how the Revlon standard applies to those actions
involving cash sales of companies); In re TW Services, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. Nos. 10427,
10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical
Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919,
927 n.25 (2001) (“In its simplest formulation, Revlon requires directors who wish to sell the
company for cash to take affirmative steps to obtain the highest sale price reasonably
available.”); Black & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 539–40 (“The most common port of entry
into Revlon[]land is a cash sale . . . . Cash sales . . . are an easy case for limiting the target
board’s discretion . . . .”).
115 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-45, 48 (applying enhanced scrutiny to a stock-for-stock merger
where the transaction would result in a change of control because the acquirer had a
controlling stockholder); see also Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 928 (“The prior decisions of this Court
have identified the circumstances where board action must be subjected to enhanced judicial
scrutiny . . . . such as when the board enters into a merger transaction that will cause a
change in corporate control, initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell the corporation,
or makes a breakup of the corporate entity investigable.” (citations omitted)); In re Santa Fe
Pac. Co. S’holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (same); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994) (same).
116 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42–48 (interpreting Time-Warner as declining to apply enhanced
scrutiny to a transaction because both corporations were widely traded and control after the
transaction would remain in the market); see.
117 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 931 (Del. 2003) (“[D]efensive devices . . . must withstand
enhanced judicial scrutiny under the Unocal standard of review, even when that merger
transaction does not result in a change of control.” (citations omitted)); Time-Warner, 571
A.2d at 1150–51 (rejecting application of enhanced scrutiny to mergers under Revlon but
holding that defensive measures in merger agreements are “properly subject to a Unocal
analysis”); accord McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(“Under a ‘duck’ approach to the law, ‘deal protection’ terms self-evidently designed to deter
and make more expensive alternative transactions would be considered defensive and
reviewed under the [Unocal] standard.”); Strine, supra note 114, at 934 (arguing for Unocal
review of defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger agreements).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/2

30

Afsharipour and Laster: Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side

2019]

ENHANCED SCRUNITY ON THE BUY-SIDE

473

motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire
fiduciaries and their advisers to be less than faithful.”118 These
interests warrant applying enhanced scrutiny to the sale of a
corporation, with or without an initial hostile bid.119
The divergent interests of advisors also support the application
of enhanced scrutiny in third-party M&A scenarios. Investment
banks play a “central role . . . in the evaluation, exploration,
selection, and implementation of strategic alternatives. . . .”120 “The
senior management suite of an operating company is unlikely to be
118 In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (considering a
transaction in which management contemplated a later management buy-out involving
certain assets); see Lear, 926 A.2d at 114–15 (concluding that there is a reasonable probability
that a CEO nearing retirement was motivated to sell by his desire to secure his nest egg);
Topps, 926 A.2d at 88 (observing that the directors’ tepid response to a topping bidder
“regrettably suggests that the Topps Incumbent Directors favored Eisner, who they perceived
as a friendly suitor who had pledged to retain management and would continue Shorin and
his family in an influential role”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 194 (noting that executives may have
“an incentive to favor a particular bidder (or type of bidder),” especially if “some bidders might
desire to retain existing management or to provide them with future incentives while others
might not”); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t Inc., No. Civ. A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *19 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that management was “likely to be retained, had discussed better
contracts, and might obtain such contracts after the merger”); see also In re Atheros
Commc’ns, Inc., C.A. No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011)
(requiring disclosure of the fact that CEO would be employed by a strategic acquirer); In re
SS & C Techs. Inc. S’holders Litig., 911 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to approve
disclosure-only settlement where the record supported an inference that the CEO “instigated
this transaction through the use of corporate resources but without prior authorization from
the board of directors. . . . in order to identify a transaction in which he could both realize a
substantial cash payout for some of his shares and use his remaining shares and options to
fund a sizeable investment in the resulting entity”). In re Prime Hosp., Inc., No. Civ. A. 652A, 2005 WL 1138738, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (refusing to approve settlement of
stockholder litigation in part because of a CEO conflict of interest that made the compromised
claims relatively strong); cf. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 692–
93 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that the target company’s top officers bargained for increased
severance compensation in anticipation of potential sale).
119 See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (“The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon
(and Unocal) contexts are, in large measure, rooted in a concern that the board might harbor
personal motivations in the sale context that differ from what is best for the corporation and
its stockholders. Most traditionally, there is the danger that top corporate managers will
resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, or prefer a sale to one industry rival
rather than another for reasons having more to do with personal ego than with what is best
for stockholders.” (footnote omitted)); Topps, 926 A.2d at 64 (“When directors bias the process
against one bidder and toward another not in a reasoned effort to maximize advantage for
the stockholders, but to tilt the process toward the bidder more likely to continue current
management, they commit a breach of fiduciary duty.” (footnote omitted)).
120 In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 90 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d, 129 A.3d
816 (Del. 2015).
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populated with M&A experts. The company’s board of directors
accordingly needs outside help when another company proposes a
merger or the company’s managers themselves inquire into sales
possibilities.”121
Advisors, however, face conflicts of interest of their own.
Delaware decisions have considered conflicts and complications
arising out of a sell-side advisor’s interest in offering buy-side
financing,122 a sell-side advisor’s economic interest in the buyer,123
a sell-side advisor’s status as a creditor to the seller,124 a sell-side
advisor’s contemporaneous representation of the buyer on another
deal,125 and a sell-side advisor’s longstanding relationship with
121 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1,
11–12 (2014) (citation omitted); accord Tuch, supra note 51, at 1088 (“Principals retain
advisors because they themselves generally lack the expertise and experience to conceive,
structure, and execute these deals . . . .”); William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO
Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2061 (1990) (explaining that
directors rely on advisors because directors frequently have “little or no experience in the sale
of a public company”).
122 See, e.g., Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 at 99–100 (finding a sell-side advisor aided and
abetted board’s breach of fiduciary duties where it failed to disclose efforts to act as buy-side
financier); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’Holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 833 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(enjoining a merger where sell-side advisor “structured a small, private process that
maximized the likelihood that it could provide acquisition financing”); Ortsman v. Green, C.A.
No. 2670-N, 2007 WL 702475, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2007) (ordering expedited discovery
into board decision-making process where target's financial advisor participated in the buyside financing even though company retained a separate financial advisor to render a fairness
opinion); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005–1006 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(examining sell-side advisor’s “questionable desire to provide buy-side financing”); see also
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 121, at 10 (“Bankers often have ties to acquiring companies
and the parties financing their deals, leading to incentives to cater to the other side of the
negotiating table.”). See Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Opacity, Trust,
Reputation, and Law: The Evolution of Commitment in Investment Banking, 7 J. LEGAL.
ANALYSIS 363, 410 (2015) (“Stapled financing is the source of at least two conflicts. First, it
discourages an advisor from seeking higher bids, because they serve to reduce the value of
the security it takes when financing the deal. Second, it incentivizes the advisor bank to
recommend bids by firms that are likely to use the stapled financing.”).
123 See El Paso, 41 A.3d at 440 (examining conflicts of interest where sell-side advisor
owned 19% of bidder and controlled two of its board seats); Solash v. Telex Corp., 1988 WL
3587, at *5, *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) (considering implications for breach of fiduciary duty
claims of sell-side financial advisor’s ownership of 10% of acquirer).
124 See Khanna v. McMinn, No. Civ. A. 20545-NC, 2006 WL 1388744, at *25 (Del. Ch. May
9, 2006) (finding plaintiffs had raised facts sufficient to “create a reasonable doubt that the
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment” where investment bank
provided a bridge loan to the seller to be repaid with the sale proceeds).
125 Transcript of Telephone Conference at *11–12, In re PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders Litig.,
C.A. No. 9880-VCL, at 11–12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2015) (considering allegations that a sell-side
advisor aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by board where advisor had extensive
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parties on the other side of the bargaining table.126 An advisor may
also “act with a view to obtaining or maintaining a lucrative
advisory relationship with the managers of the merger’s surviving
company.”127
Customary investment banker compensation arrangements can
also influence the outcomes of sales processes.128 For M&A
transactions, investment bankers often enter into a contingent
compensation arrangement that pays the banker a percentage of

relationship with most likely bidder including contemporaneously representing it in another
significant transaction, having received over $50 million dollars in fees from it over the last
several years, and lending it significant sums of money).
126 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 8703-VCL, 9079-VCL, 2015
WL 5052214, at *2, *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (finding sell-side advisor “acted improperly by
favoring Murdock [the bidder] and treating him as the bank’s real client in transactions
before the Merger” where it “had worked with Murdock for years” and was
contemporaneously working with him on other engagements); Simonetti v. Margolis, C.A. No.
3694-VCN, 2008 WL 5048692, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) (issuing a preliminary
injunction where target failed to disclose that its current advisor had advised the bidder in
connection with a prior potential financing in the target and the bidder’s advisor had advised
the seller in connection with the same); In re Emerging Commc’n, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ.
A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *25, *32 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (finding take-private was
“unfairly structured” where CEO and purchaser “co-opted” company’s long-term advisors that
“possessed material nonpublic information about [the company’s] values, business and
prospects”); see also In re Prime Hospitality, Inc. S’Holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 652-N, 2005 WL
1138738, at *9–12 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (declining to approve a settlement where sell-side
advisor had a longstanding relationship with buyer that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to explore);
Braunschweiger v. Am. Home Shield Corp., C.A. No.10755, 1991 WL 3920, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 7, 1991) (denying a motion for summary judgment where proxy failed to disclose that
manager leading MBO was involved in retention of special committee’s investment banker);
cf. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1277 (granting targeted injunction on appeal against asset lockup and no-shop clause where directors relied on advice from conflicted management’s
financial advisor).
127 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 121, at 21 (citations omitted); see, e.g., In re John Q.
Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *16 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss relating to a disclosure claim focusing on
conflict of interest that banker faced “because it had contacts with [the buyer] about the
possibility of underwriting the nearly $700 million commercial mortgage-backed security
offering planned by [the buyer] after completion of the Merger”).
128 See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 90 (holding investment banker liable for aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty by board of directors where banker sought to maximize its own fees
when structuring and conducting sale process); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d
531, 542 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that target’s financial advisor “had an incentive to prefer a
sale over a liquidation of the company because its fee agreement provided it with additional
payments for a sale”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199 (noting that for the target’s financial advisor,
“[t]he path of dealing with a discrete set of private equity players was attractive to its primary
client contact—management—and the quickest (and lowest cost) route to a definitive sales
agreement”).
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the deal’s value if it closes.129 Although a contingent fee
arrangement generally will align the interests of the agent in
getting more compensation with the principal's desire to obtain the
best value,130 the interests of the agent and principal diverge over
whether to take the deal in the first place. “The agent only gets paid
if the deal happens, but for the principal, the best value may be not
doing the deal at all.”131 A similar dynamic plays out on a smaller
scale during the final negotiations over price. “The contingently
compensated agent has a greater incentive to get the deal done
rather than push for the last quarter, particularly if pushing too
hard might jeopardize the deal and if the terms on offer are already
defensible.”132 Furthermore, many investment bankers are repeat
players. Not only can they “generate greater aggregate
compensation by completing more total transactions with slightly
less compensation on each deal” but when “the opposite side in the
negotiation is a repeat player that has used and could continue to
See Tuch, supra note 51, at 1097–1098 (discussing advisor fees).
See, e.g., In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL
864928, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (“Contingent fees are undoubtedly routine; they reduce
the target's expense if a deal is not completed; perhaps, they properly incentivize the financial
advisor to focus on the appropriate outcome.”); Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No.
7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) (noting that a contingent fee creates “an
incentive to obtain the best available price for all . . . stockholders”).
131 Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 94.
132 Id. at 94 (finding that a board acted unreasonably for purposes of enhanced scrutiny
analysis by failing to provide sufficient oversight to an investment banker during final
negotiations over price); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 442 (discussing how a $35-million-or-nothing
contingent fee made “more questionable some of the tactical advice given by Morgan Stanley
and some of its valuation advice, . . . .”); Atheros, 2011 WL 864928, at *8 (noting that a
“contingent fee can readily be seen as providing an extraordinary incentive for [an investment
bank] to support the Transaction”); Transcripts of the Rulings of the Court at 10, Forgo v.
Health Grades, Inc., C.A. No. 5716–VCS, at 10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2010) (“[T]he reality is if [the
investment bank] can get a deal, they get a deal.”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199 (noting that
although an investment bank would receive 1.7% of any deal, it had “a strong incentive to
bring about conditions that would facilitate a deal that would close”); In re Tele–
Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 (Del. Ch.
revised Jan. 10, 2006) (“[T]he contingent compensation of the financial advisor, DLJ, of
roughly $40 million creates a serious issue of material fact, as to whether DLJ (and DLJ's
legal counsel) could provide independent advice to the Special Committee.”); see also City
Capital Assocs. L.P. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 793 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.)
(“The board had agreed to a compensation arrangement with Wasserstein Perella that gives
that firm substantial contingency pay if a restructuring is successfully completed. Thus,
Wasserstein Perella has a rather straightforward and conventional conflict of interest when
it opines that the inherently disputable value of its restructuring is greater than the all cash
alternative offered by plaintiffs.”).
129
130
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use the agent’s services, then the incentives to maintain goodwill
and not push too hard become all the greater.” 133
As these examples indicate, “[i]nvestment bankers have ample
opportunities for misconduct resulting from . . . the conflicts of
interest afflicting the firms for which they work.”134 Some have
observed that “conflict is inevitable in investment banking.”135
Importantly, the consequences of the contacts and relationships
that can generate conflicts are not necessarily negative. “[T]he
advisor’s value stems in part from these very contacts, for the
contacts are the sources of the information the advisor brings to the
seller’s table.”136 Put differently, “[c]onflicted bankers, if
appropriately managed, can add value to a deal,” but “conflicted
bankers” who are “not appropriately managed, can be a destructive
influence even given full disclosure and engagement of a second,
unconflicted banker.”137
What matters here is that the involvement of contingently
compensated and potentially conflicted advisors heightens the
complications created in the high-pressure, high-risk, and highreward context of a third-party M&A event. As several
commentators have now suggested, the overarching reality of
decision-making context counsels in favor of applying enhanced
133 Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 94 (footnote omitted); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 444 (noting that
a conflicted negotiator has a duty “to squeeze the last drop of the lemon out for . . .
stockholders,” but that the conflict gave the negotiator “a motive to keep juice in the lemon
that he could use to make a financial Collins for himself . . . .”); id. (“[A] fist fight of a
negotiation might leave a bloodied [adversary] unreceptive to a [future deal] . . . .”); Gesoff v.
IIC Indus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1150–51 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that investment bank's
relationship with buy-side controlling stockholder “robs [its] fairness opinion of its value as
an indicator of fairness . . . .”); cf. Lear, 926 A.2d at 116 (noting that if a CEO received equity
on the buy side post-merger, “the failure to get the [optimal] price for Lear now would not
hurt him as much as the public stockholders . . . .”).
134 Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
101, 107 (2014).
135 Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm Jr., Trust, Reputation, and Law: The Evolution
of Commitment in Investment Banking, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 363, 407 (2015); see also
Simonetti v. Margolis, C.A. No. 3694-VCN, 2008 WL 5048692, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008)
(“Perhaps it is unavoidable that financial advisors regularly seem to suffer from conflicts of
one degree or another . . . .”).
136 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 121, at 21; accord Eric S. Klinger-Wilensky & Nathan
P. Emeritz, Financial Advisors’ Engagement Letters: Post-Rural/Metro Thoughts and
Observations, 71 BUS. LAW. 53, 59 (2015) (discussing how conflict disclosure in engagement
letters can “assist the board in . . . deciding whether to engage the financial advisor in spite
of (or in many cases because of the benefits arising from) the potential conflict[s].”).
137 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 121, at 9.
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scrutiny to all sell-side M&A transactions, regardless of the form of
consideration.138 To date, the Delaware Supreme Court has not
openly adopted the broader understanding of the potential conflicts
presented by M&A scenarios that Chief Justice Strine articulated
while serving as a member of the Court of Chancery.
The court has recognized, however, that enhanced scrutiny
applies to a board’s decision to include deal protection measures in
a merger agreement, even if the merger agreement is a stock-forstock transaction to which enhanced scrutiny would not otherwise
apply under Delaware’s current patchwork of precedent.139
Enhanced scrutiny applies to these measures because “[t]here are
138 See Laster, supra note 7, at 35 (“[I]f potential conflicts drive enhanced scrutiny, then
enhanced scrutiny should apply to negotiated acquisitions, regardless of the form of
consideration”); Morgan White-Smith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of
Mergers Depend on the Method of Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1177, 1206 (2012) (arguing for
“[a] broad application of enhanced scrutiny to corporate acquisitions and mergers . . . .”); Black
& Kraakman, supra note 76, at 536 (noting that stock-for-stock mergers “justify similar
scrutiny”). See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and
Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 886
(2003). Professor Stephen Bainbridge also has argued in favor of dispensing with the focus
on consideration and instead focusing on conflicts, but with the different end point of
eliminating cash deals involving a publicly-traded acquirer as a context where enhanced
scrutiny applies. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3277, 3335 (2013) (“[S]o long as acquisitions of publicly held corporations are conducted
by other publicly held corporations, diversified shareholders will be indifferent as to the
allocations of gains between the parties.”). Critical to his assessment is the belief that
problematic conflicts of interest do not warrant concern when the acquirer is a publicly-traded
entity. Alternatively, he posits that any harm from the conflict washes out because diversified
stockholders are likely to hold shares in both entities. See id. at 3331–33 (noting that in
publicly traded entities owned by dispersed shareholders in the “large, fluid, changeable and
changing market . . . . [t]he form of consideration is simply irrelevant”). The hypothesis that
public company deals fail to create divergent interests for management and directors is, we
believe, a stretch. The diversified stockholder rationale, by contrast, is a fair argument from
the standpoint of societal efficiency, but it fails to reckon with the fiduciary nature of the
Delaware law analysis, which concerns itself with the relationship between the corporate
fiduciaries and the stockholders to whom those fiduciaries owe duties. But he does properly
identify the weakness of the cash-versus-stock dichotomy that persists in Delaware law.
139 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 931 (“[D]efensive devices . . . must withstand enhanced
judicial scrutiny under the Unocal standard of review, even when that merger transaction
does not result in a change of control.” (footnote omitted)); Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150–
51 (rejecting application of enhanced scrutiny to merger under Revlon but holding that
defensive measures in merger agreement are “properly subject to a Unocal analysis.”); accord
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Under a ‘duck’
approach to the law, ‘deal protection’ terms self-evidently designed to deter and make more
expensive alternative transactions would be considered defensive and reviewed under the
[Unocal] standard.”). See generally Strine, supra note 114, at 934 (arguing for Unocal review
of defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger agreements).
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inherent conflicts between a board’s interest in protecting a merger
transaction it has approved, the stockholders’ statutory right to
make the final decision to either approve or not approve a merger,
and the board’s continuing responsibility to effectively exercise its
fiduciary duties at all times after the merger agreement is
executed.”140 The Delaware Supreme Court has thus recognized that
a sufficient conflict exists in these scenarios to warrant applying
enhanced scrutiny, albeit only to portions of the merger agreement.
IV. THE FIT BETWEEN ENHANCED SCRUTINY AND BUY-SIDE M&A
DECISIONS
From a theoretical standpoint, enhanced scrutiny seems like a
strong fit for reviewing buy-side M&A decision-making. It is not a
perfect fit. Nevertheless, from a doctrinal perspective, applying
enhanced scrutiny to buy-side M&A decisions is a logical extension
of the doctrine. This section will explain some of the supportive and
countervailing considerations for applying enhanced scrutiny to a
board’s decision to buy a company.
A. SUPPORTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of reasons to extend enhanced scrutiny to
buy-side M&A decisions. We expand on the three primary reasons
below.
Most prominently, the core conflict-derived rationale for applying
enhanced scrutiny on the sell-side applies equally on the buy-side
M&A scenarios. As discussed in Part I, empirical studies show that
buy-side M&A settings create potentially powerful incentives for
senior managers that may cause their interests to diverge from
those of the corporation and its stockholders as a whole.141 This is
especially true in public company acquisitions, where the potential
for realization of the value of the transaction is uncertain, but the
prestige and compensation connected with purchasing another
public company is high. Enhanced scrutiny addresses precisely this
risk.

140
141

Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930.
See supra Part II.A.
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The sell-side concern that contingently compensated advisors
may magnify the confounding incentives faced by senior managers
applies to the buy-side as well. Like potential sellers, potential
acquirers regularly hire investment bankers under contingency fee
arrangements, which gives the bankers powerful financial
incentives to pursue and close deals.142 Unlike on the sell-side,
where the acquisition of a client and the resulting disappearance of
a source of business may mitigate the advisor’s eagerness to support
a sale, similar relationships on the buy-side reinforce the financial
incentive. A longstanding advisor’s personal relationship with
management may give the advisor additional reason to support an
acquisition that management favors, particularly if a successful
acquisition may lead to a bigger company that will purchase more
companies in the future.143 Although legal advisors usually do not
receive contingent compensation,144 the same concerns about
ongoing relationships and support for management’s chosen path
apply to legal advisors.
The real-world decision-making context in which boards operate
also supports extending enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions. At
present, there is reason to suspect that without a jurisprudential
prod like enhanced scrutiny, directors may not be sufficiently
involved in the buy-side acquisition process—just as they were less
involved in the sell-side acquisition process before the systemic
shock of Van Gorkom, Revlon, and other cases from the watershed
year.145 Descriptive accounts indicate that boards are reluctant to
become deeply involved in acquisitions, preferring to leave the
process in the hands of management and their advisors,146 with the
See supra notes 120–137.
Frankel, supra note 55, at 357–358.
144 There are exceptions. See Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a
Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2000)
(describing examples of contingency fees in M&A work).
145 See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. The jurisprudential prod may be an
important tool for the further development of norms and best practices for buy-side boards in
reviewing the recommendations of potentially conflicted managements and advisers. See
generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Lymon Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847 (2009).
146 See Chinta Bhagat & Bill Huyett, Modernizing the Board’s Role in M&A, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (Feb. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-andcorporate-finance/our-insights/modernizing-the-boards-role-in-m-and-a
(“Many
boards,
reluctant to cross the line between governance and management, miss opportunities to help
142
143
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board restricting itself to an advisory and oversight roles.147
Although the board theoretically retains ultimate approval
authority, once management and its advisors begin to feel
committed to a deal and have expended significant resources to
move forward on a transaction, abandoning plans can be quite
difficult.148
Extending enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions also
recognizes another real-world aspect of the decision-making
environment: boards often are not considering an acquisition in
isolation but rather as part of an overall menu of strategic
alternatives. Those alternatives frequently will include sell-side
possibilities which trigger enhanced scrutiny under existing
Delaware law, such as a sale for cash, a stock transaction, or
recapitalization in which the corporation emerges with a controlling
stockholder. Equally important, announcing an acquisition may
have the unintended effect of putting a company in play, thereby
generating a scenario in which enhanced scrutiny will apply from
the sell-side perspective.149

senior executives win at M&A.”); see also Holly J. Gregory, The Board’s Role in M&A
Transactions, PRACTICAL L.J. 36 (May 2014) (encouraging greater board involvement in
M&A).
147 See Alexandra R. Lajoux, Role of the Board in M&A, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. & FIN.
REG. (Sept. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/07/role-of-the-board-in-ma/; see
also KPMG, The Board’s Perspectives on M&A: From Due Diligence to Day 1 and Beyond 1
(2013),
http://www.execed.kpmg.com/content/PDF/The-Boards-Perspective-on-MA.pdf
(“About one in three of the directors surveyed say their board could be more involved in
shaping M&A strategy and in evaluating deals proposed by management.”).
148 See Gregory, supra note 146 at 34–35 (noting the many considerations for potential deal
activity and how management teams can develop strong views about courses of action).
149 As Chief Justice Strine observed while serving on the Court of Chancery:
It is no small thing for a strategic acquirer to come public about its desire to
buy another industry player. Although management-side doctrinal junkies
will cry that a board’s interest in buying another industry competitor does
not mean that the company would be well served by a similar transaction in
which it is the seller—i.e., that the company is “in play”—the reality is that
the announcement of interest in a strategic transaction does signal that some
other business strategy rather than the status quo would, in the board’s
judgment, be optimal.
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 603-04. Because a buy-side decision may lead to a sell-side M&A
scenario, the conflicts raised by the latter lurk in the former, albeit one step removed. The
risk that a buy-side decision may lead to a sell-side scenario reinforces the case for applying
enhanced scrutiny to the original buy-side.
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Under present Delaware law, a lawyer attempting to guide
directors through various possibilities would advise that the
business judgment rule applies to some alternatives, while
enhanced scrutiny applies to others. Extending enhanced scrutiny
to the buy-side alternatives applies a consistent standard of review,
thereby framing the inquiry in terms of the real-world question that
directors typically ask: which of these alternatives is reasonably
likely to provide the best risk-adjusted value for the stockholders?
B. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS

Although there are good reasons to extend enhanced scrutiny to
buy-side M&A decisions, the concept is not a perfect fit. This section
describes four concerns to extending enhanced scrutiny to the buyside.
For starters, extending enhanced scrutiny to acquisitions will not
make sense to those who perceive enhanced scrutiny in the deal
context as a special obligation to maximize immediate stockholder
value. In part because of the implications of such a shift, this school
of thought seeks to limit strictly the application of enhanced
scrutiny to three categories of sell-side deal structures: (i) sales for
cash, (ii) transactions resulting in a change of control, and (iii)
transactions leading to the break-up of the company.150 For those
who resist expanding enhanced scrutiny beyond these categories,
extending it to the buy-side would be anathema. Nevertheless, as
we highlighted above, we disagree with this narrow reading of the
enhanced scrutiny doctrine.151
Even if one accepts that the impetus for enhanced scrutiny arises
from situational conflicts, there is reason to think that the level of
potential conflict on the buy-side may not be as pronounced as on
the sell-side, or at least is subject to greater regulation by market
forces. Commentators have argued that actual and potential

150 See Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-land, supra note 138, at 3331–32 (describing
the three categories). This approach relies heavily on two Chancery Court cases. See In re
Santa Fe Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995); Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp.,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994).
151 See supra Part III.B.
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conflicts of interest arise in sell-side situations because of the final
period problem.152
[I]n a situation where parties expect to have repeated
transactions, the recognition that a party who cheats in
one transaction will be penalized by the other party in
subsequent transactions reduces the incentive to cheat.
However, when a transaction is the last (or only) in a
series—that is, the final period—the incentive to cheat
reappears because, by definition, the penalty for doing
so has disappeared.153
In the ordinary course of business, the ability of managers to
shirk or self-deal is constrained not only by legal duties but also by
a range of markets, including the product markets, capital markets,
employment markets, and the market for corporate control.154
These markets react to board and managerial actions and penalize
decisions inconsistent with corporate interests. But when managers

152 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 788–89 (discussing the final period problem); accord
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Story of Smith v. Van Gorkom, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 197,
223 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009) (“Corporate acquisitions are a classic example of what
game theories refer to as ‘final period problems.’”) [hereinafter Story of Van Gorkom]; Sean
J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899,
1945 (2003) (“Although the drama and hyperbole of a bust up acquisition is typically not
present in the context of a ‘friendly’ merger—after all, the business continues to operate and
many employees keep their jobs—last period features are still present at the level of the board
of directors and senior management, many of whom are likely to be in the last period of their
employment.”); Black & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 536 (describing negotiated acquisition
as a scenario in which “the target's managers and board will likely lose their positions. They
face a strong conflict of interest, yet they are in a final period where reputation and fear of
future discipline lose their force as constraints on self-interested behavior.”); Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 37, 54 (1990) (“A
friendly merger in which the ownership of a constituent company remains diffuse but de facto
control shifts from one management team to another, is no less a control shift than a
transaction that gives rise to a control block . . . . [T]he absence of [a controller] . . . does not
reduce the danger that [stockholder] interests will suffer under the merger terms negotiated
by their own management.”).
153 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 720 (2d ed. 1995).
154 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 785 (“Corporate directors operate within a pervasive
web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for monitoring by residual claimants. A
variety of market forces provide important constraints. The capital and product markets, the
internal and external employment markets, and the market for corporate control all constrain
shirking by firm agents.”).
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are in their final period, market constraints have less bite, and
managers are more likely to favor their own interests or self-deal.155
Significant acquisitions can give rise to final period problems,
particularly if the transaction threatens job losses for buy-side
fiduciaries. Unlike sell-side transactions, however, the buy-side
entity continues. Other markets should penalize poor buy-side
acquisitions, providing additional checks on buy-side decision
making. If the acquirer has overpaid, then the stock market should
punish its shares, and the fewer resources that it has available for
other corporate purposes should undercut its ability to compete
more broadly.156 In theory, buy-side fiduciaries should take these
risks into account, and they should mitigate buy-side conflicts to a
better extent than on the sell-side.
Buy-side M&A situations also differ from sell-side scenarios in
that not all transactions involve potentially transformational or
significant outcomes for the acquirer. The best example is when a
large entity buys a much smaller one—colloquially described as the
whale swallowing the minnow. On the sell-side, the separate
business identity of the minnow is likely to disappear, both in the
strict legal sense of a merger and in the larger metaphorical sense.
On the buy-side, this need not be true. A large business could buy a
small business without the transaction having meaningful effect on
its corporate culture or personnel, and the empirical evidence
indicates that there is less reason for concern about these types of
acquisitions.157 This suggests that the application of enhanced
scrutiny to buy-side M&A scenarios could require greater flexibility
in the application of the doctrine and potentially more nuanced linedrawing.158
Perhaps the strongest reason to question whether enhanced
scrutiny should apply to buy-side decisions is the doctrine’s mixed

Id. at 788.
For a discussion of why the right to sell many not sufficiently discipline managers of the
acquirer, see Afsharipour, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 142-144.
157 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
158 This article does not address where the line should be drawn, leaving that area open for
future work. Nevertheless, there are existing sources of authority that could prove helpful,
such as situations where positive law already requires buy-side votes. These sources include
(i) a largely moribund voting requirement for direct mergers under Delaware law involving
the issuance of 20% or more of the acquirer’s stock and (ii) listing standards that have created
a taxonomy of transactions warranting stockholder votes.
155
156
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record in addressing sell-side conflicts. There is little reason to think
that the track record for buy-side decisions would be better, and at
least one reason to think it would be worse.
One recurring criticism of enhanced scrutiny on the sell-side is
that it evolved into a relatively toothless test. In the more than four
decades since the introduction of the intermediate standard of
review, courts have rarely held that sell-side fiduciaries breached
their fiduciary duties under enhanced scrutiny. Just one decision
(the implicit application of enhanced scrutiny in Van Gorkom) held
directors liable for breaching their duties.159 One other decision
(RBC Capital Markets) held that an investment banker was liable
for aiding and abetting directors in breaching their fiduciary
duties.160 A handful of decisions resulted in the issuance of
preliminary injunctions against particular transaction features.161
Another handful of cases held under the injunction standard that a
plaintiff had shown a reasonable probability of proving at trial that
the directors had breached their duties under the enhanced scrutiny
standard, but deferred to stockholders to accept or vote down the
transaction, at times with the benefit of additional disclosures
regarding the deal process and the subtle conflicts that played a role
in generating the deal.162 Some enhanced scrutiny cases have

488 A.2d 858.
129 A.3d 816, 849 (Del. 2015).
161 See QVC, 738 A.2d at 51 (affirming injunction against no-shop provision and stockoption lockup and extending injunction to include termination fee); Macmillan, 59 A.2d at
1285-86, 1288 (affirming injunction against waiver of rights plan and expanding injunction
to include crown-jewel asset lockup and no-shop clause); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85 (issuing
targeted preliminary injunction against crown-jewel asset lockup, no-shop clause, and
provision waiving rights plan to allow existing deal to proceed); Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 840-43
(granting conditional injunction against transaction subject to injunction lifting if parties
conducted a twenty-day post-signing process); Topps, 926 A.2d at 87–91 (granting conditional
injunction against transaction subject to injunction lifting if target board waived standstill
provision for topping bidder). In Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Chancery’s denial of a preliminary injunction, but rather than issuing a targeted
preliminary injunction or directing the trial court to issue one, the high court held that the
challenged provisions were “invalid and unenforceable.” 818 A.2d at 937.
162 See, e.g., El Paso, 41 A.3d at 434 (finding reasonable likelihood of success on merits but
denying preliminary injunction where “the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice
whether to turn down the Merger themselves”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 208 (finding reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, but denying preliminary injunction; noting that “when a
potential Revlon violation occurred but no rival bid is on the table, the denial of injunctive
relief is often premised on the imprudence of having the court enjoin the only deal on the
table, when the stockholders can make that decision for themselves.” (footnote omitted)).
159
160
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settled for significant monetary payments, but these settlements
are rare.163
Many factors likely contributed to the lack of rulings finding that
sell-side directors breached their duties under the enhanced
scrutiny standard of review. One important factor is the complexity
of the decisions that directors face. Evaluating competing
alternatives and deciding to sell a corporation are judgment-laden
endeavors. Even when weighing an all-cash transaction, directors
must consider issues like the likelihood of closure, the timing of
payment, and tax effects.164 In a stock deal, because the
consideration includes an ownership interest in an ongoing entity,
the directors are entitled to consider how that entity will generate
value over the long-term. The board may attribute value to the
synergies that would be created by combining the two companies.
The board may anticipate that the combined company could be sold
at some point in the future.
Any or all of these factors could lead the directors to conclude
that the share of the entity their corporation’s pre-transaction
stockholders would own post-combination represents the best
alternative available.165 When directors have worked through
complex issues with the assistance of advisors, it is exceedingly
difficult for a court to reach a different outcome, even when there is
some evidence of divergent interests or personal advantage. Similar
complexities await the judiciary in reviewing buy-side decisions
under enhanced scrutiny. There is no reason to think that courts
will be better at evaluating whether buy-side decisions fall within a
range of reasonableness, or will be more willing to involve
themselves in debatable matters.
A perhaps more significant criticism of sell-side enhanced
scrutiny doctrine is that it evolved into a vehicle for rent-extraction

163 See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of
Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 627–29 (2017)
(identifying six M&A litigation settlements that generated significant monetary recoveries,
in addition to the post-trial ruling in Rural-Metro and a settlement of claims challenging a
restructuring in Activision).
164 See, e.g., Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 578 (noting that when evaluating competing bids,
the target board appropriately considered relative antitrust risk and contractual provisions
addressing regulatory issues, indicating that “[v]alue is not value if it is not ultimately paid”).
165 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44, 44 n.14 (outlining how a board should work through sell-side
decisions).
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by specialized plaintiffs’ law firms. Plaintiffs’ lawyers quickly
recognized that they could plead claims for breach of duty under
enhanced scrutiny with relative ease. The doctrine of enhanced
scrutiny was designed to be sensitive to the possibility of disloyalty
under ambiguous circumstances, and it therefore adopted proplaintiff features like the reasonableness standard and the placing
of the burden of proof on the defendants.166 These litigation features
made enhanced scrutiny meaningful, but they also made it difficult
for the defendants and trial courts to dispose of weak cases. The
Delaware Supreme Court effectively endorsed the bringing of weak
cases when it declined to dismiss a post-closing challenge to
defensive measures in a third-party merger agreement, stating,
“[t]his case may very well illustrate the difficulty of expeditiously
dispensing with claims seeking enhanced judicial scrutiny at the
pleading stage where the complaint is not completely conclusory.”167
Slowly at first, and then at an accelerating place, the volume of
stockholder-led, sell-side M&A litigation increased.168 During the
first decade of the 21st century, it became an epidemic, with sellside challenges to over 90% of all takeovers in excess of $100
million.169 This was an obvious red flag, because if there was good
reason to think that over 90% of all takeovers had deep fiduciary
problems, then some type of systemic intervention was needed.
More telling, the avalanche of lawsuits produced comparably
minimal value for stockholders. The vast majority of cases were
resolved through disclosure-only settlements, in which the
defendants agreed to make supplemental disclosures to
stockholders in advance of the vote on the merger, and the merger
parties and their directors, officers, affiliates, and advisors received
a court-approved global release of known and unknown claims.170
In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 72 (Del. 1995).
Id.
168 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475 tbl.I, 476 tbl.II (2015) (documenting
the increase in merger litigation overall and the number of suits filed in connection with each
individual transaction).
169 Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies:
Review of 2014 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1, 1 fig.1 (2015).
170 See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of
Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 877 (2016) (“[A] generation of routine
disclosure settlements undermined in various respects the proper functioning of a system for
the judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties”); Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff
166
167
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As compensation for providing the ostensible benefits conferred by
the settlement, the plaintiffs’ attorneys received an award of
attorney’s fees, which for many years clustered in the mid- to highsix figures.171 The attractiveness of the disclosure-only settlement
to both defendants’ and plaintiffs’ lawyers channeled virtually all
M&A cases into the same non-substantive result.172
There is no reason to think that applying enhanced scrutiny to
buy-side acquisitions would be more successful doctrinally than it
has been on the sell-side. Sadly, the most likely result, if history is
a guide, would not be to improve the quality of buy-side decisions,
but rather open up a new avenue for rent-extraction by stockholder
plaintiffs’ firms. While some plaintiffs’ law firms sued the sell-side
directors for breaching their fiduciary duties when selling the firm,
others would sue the buy-side directors for breaching their fiduciary
duties when buying the firm. Expanding the application of
enhanced scrutiny would double the litigation opportunities. At
present, there is no reason to believe that the additional litigation
would generate benefits that would outweigh its costs.
V. A PATH TO BUY-SIDE STOCKHOLDER VOTING
Partly because of the failure of the stockholder-led M&A
litigation project, the Delaware courts have been re-tooling
litigation standards to reduce, rather than expand, the ability of the
plaintiffs’ bar to bring litigation and extract settlements. One major
Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis
and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) (arguing that there is “widespread
skepticism” concerning the value of deal litigation because, in “most settled cases, the only
relief provided to shareholders consists of supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy
statement”); see also In re Trulia Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891–99 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(describing features of disclosure-only settlements and their problems).
171 See Friedlander, supra note 170, at 878 (discussing fees awarded for disclosure
settlements); Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 170, at 558–59 (same); Cain & Solomon,
supra note 168, at 478–79 (same).
172 There were exceptions to the general rule, and some stockholder litigation generated
meaningful results. See Friedlander, supra note 163, at 627–28 (collecting cases). The
stockholder plaintiffs’ bar largely bifurcated into two groups: “One tier of law firms pursued
disclosure settlements as a business model” and “[a]nother tier of law firms never presented
disclosure settlements to the Court of Chancery, and instead brought Revlon cases with the
objective of seeking a significant monetary recovery [or] significant non-monetary relief.”
Friedlander, supra note 170, at 904–05. While some plaintiffs’ firms engaged in meaningful
litigation activity and achieved monetary recoveries for investors, they were comparatively
rare. Id.
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development has been to hold that a fully informed stockholder vote
on a merger lowers the standard of review applicable to a thirdparty M&A situation from enhanced scrutiny to the business
judgment rule.173 If enhanced scrutiny were extended to buy-side
decisions, a likely countermove by transaction planners would be to
condition more buy-side deals on favorable stockholder votes,
thereby restoring the application of the business judgment rule.
Indeed, one argument in favor of extending enhanced scrutiny to
buy-side decisions rests not on the ability of the litigation itself to
generate superior outcomes, but rather as an inducement to more
frequent buy-side votes that would enable stockholders to guard
against bidder overpayment.
Just as empirical studies provide evidence for the problem of
bidder overpayment,174 they likewise provide an entry point for
understanding the potential benefits of buy-side voting. A study
from 2008 found that “acquisitions without acquirer shareholder
approval are associated with lower synergistic gains, both in
percentage and dollar values.”175 The same study presented
evidence that “deals without shareholder voting rights are
associated with worse post-merger stock or operating performance
than those with voting rights,” which “indicates that the
requirements of shareholder voting help deter management from
pursuing mergers that are not favored by shareholders.”176 That
said, a working paper from 2006 found little evidence of the value of
bidder shareholder voting.177
More recently, a study from 2017 examined the effect of a buyside vote using a hand-collected sample of U.S. transactions

173 See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015) (holding
that a fully informed stockholder vote restores the business judgment rule as the standard of
review, with a claim for waste as the only remaining challenge).
174 See supra Part II.A.
175 Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions 5
(Mar.
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f987/
e479c7f5a36f20f0b0835757bcff01de223d.pdf.
176 Id.
177 Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 2, 4–5 (Am. Law & Econ.
Ass’n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 64, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1799&context=alea.
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between 1995-2015.178 The study found that in deals without buyside votes, acquirer announcement returns were 3% lower than for
deals requiring votes.179 The authors observe that “[g]iven that the
average acquirer has a market capitalization of $3.2 billion in our
vote avoidance sample, a 3.0% difference in merger announcement
returns corresponds to a value reduction of over $96 million, an
economically significant amount to acquirer shareholders.”180
Moreover, the study found that bidders attempted to accumulate
cash, and issue more equity, in the year prior to the deal in order
avoid a shareholder vote in an acquisition.181 The study also found
“a large and significant jump in acquirer announcement returns at
the 20% threshold in all-stock deals when shareholder voting is
mandatory,” an effect that is concentrated among acquirers with
high institutional ownership.182 The authors infer from these results
that “the prospect of a shareholder vote serves as a disciplinary
device that makes acquirer management choose targets with
greater synergies and/or offer lower premiums than in cases without
shareholder voting.”183
Another study from 2017, however, examined the effects of the
NASDAQ’s adoption of a listing requirement in 1989 that required
a stockholder vote when the bidder issues 20% or more of its
stock.184 Based on the performance of acquisitions following the
enactment of the rule, they found little evidence that shareholder
voting provides benefits to bidder shareholders.185
Conducting empirical studies of U.S. acquisition is difficult
because under U.S. corporate law rules and listing standards, the
parties to an acquisition can structure the deal to avoid a buy-side

178 See Kai Li et al., Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions 2
(European
Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
481,
2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801580 (discussing the study of buy-side voting).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 30.
183 Id. at 3.
184 Paul Mason et al., Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From the Takeover
Market, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 157 (2018).
185 See id. at 163 (finding that the study’s “results are consistent with concerns that the
costs associated with these rules outweigh the benefits”).
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vote, creating endogeneity problems.186 The strongest support for
buy-side voting comes from a study published in 2016 that examines
acquisitions in the U.K.187 Unlike in the U.S., shareholder voting for
large acquisitions in the U.K. is both mandatory and binding.188
Listing Rule 10 of the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority
requires prior approval from shareholders of the acquirer for
transactions that are large relative to the acquirer, using several
tests to measure relative size (Class 1 transactions).189 A deal that
equals or exceeds a 25% relative-size threshold under any one of the
tests is a Class 1 transaction that requires a buy-side vote.190 A deal
that does not meet the 25% relative-size threshold under any of the
tests is a Class 2 transaction that does not require a buy-side vote.191
The 2016 study examined Class 1 and Class 2 deals during an
18-year period from 1992 until 2010.192 The study found that for
Class 1 deals, shareholders gained $13.6 billion in the aggregate
over the study period.193 For Class 2 deals, shareholders lost $3
billion in the aggregate over the study period.194 The authors argue
that mandatory buy-side voting makes bidder management more
likely to refrain from overpaying or proposing deals that are not in
the interest of shareholders.195 Noting that shareholders have never
voted down a Class 1 acquisition, the authors infer the mandatory
voting mechanism works as a credible threat against bad corporate
acquisitions up front, and deals that were poorly received by the
186 See Afsharipour, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 148 (noting that “management can
choose to structure its acquisition to avoid a vote by bidder shareholders”).
187 See Becht et al., supra note 25, at 3037
188 See id. (“We study the U.K. setting, where the listing authority has devised a system
that is close to ideal because shareholder voting on large acquisitions is mandatory, binding,
and imposed via a series of threshold tests.”).
189 U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK Listing Rule 10
(2018), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/10.pdf [hereinafter FCA HANDBOOK].
190 Id. at Listing Rule 10.2.2, 10.5; see Becht et al., supra note 25, at 3041–43 (describing
U.K. Listing Rules). A class 1 transaction refers to a transaction that amounts to 25% or more
of any of the acquirer’s gross assets, profits, or gross capital, or in which the consideration is
25% or more of the market capitalization of the acquirer’s common stock. FCA HANDBOOK,
supra note 189, at Listing Rule 10.2.2.
191 FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 189, at Listing Rule 10.2.2; Becht et al., supra note 25, at
3037.
192 Becht et al., supra note 25, at 3037.
193 Id. at 3035, 3050.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 3061 (“[T]he available data does point to a deterrence effect of mandatory
shareholder voting that makes CEOs and boards more likely to refrain from overpaying.”).
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market at announcement were often withdrawn prior to the
shareholder vote.196
Taken together, the empirical research indicates that there are
real benefits to buy-side votes on acquisitions. But those benefits
are not free. Voting is costly. For a public company, the tangible
costs include preparing and disseminating a proxy statement,
soliciting and collecting proxies, holding a meeting of stockholders,
and tabulating votes.197 The need to hold a vote also creates
intangible costs in the form of transactional uncertainty and deal
risk. Shareholders may not make an informed decision, especially if
shareholders are rationally apathetic, suffer from collective action
problems, or have agency conflicts of their own.
The tangible costs are, of course, real, but acquirers already
manage these costs in transactions that currently require buy-side
stockholder votes under listing standards.198 To mitigate costs,
parties to the transaction often create a single, joint disclosure
document. Advances in technology also mitigate costs, with
electronic voting and virtual stockholder meetings easing these
aspects of the process.199 The impact of these costs is lessened under
a system where buy-side votes are not mandatory, but rather
optional as a means of lowering the buy-side standard of review
from enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule.
Whether the intangible costs of transactional uncertainty are, in
fact, costs depends on one’s sense of both the underlying problem of
bidder overpayment and the ability of buy-side voting to provide a
solution. The possibility that buy-side stockholders may vote down
a transaction is what provides the check on the overpayment

196 See id. at 3063 (explaining results indicate “mandatory shareholder voting generates
substantial value improvements for acquirer shareholders”).
197 See Stuart H. Gelfond & Burcin Eren, The NYSE’s Complex Shareholder Approval
Rules: Issuing New Securities? Do You Need Shareholder Approval?, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J.,
Sept. 2016 (noting the “extra time and expense that may come with the shareholder approval
process”).
198 See id. (“The New York Stock Exchange . . . has specific requirements applicable to listed
companies to receive shareholder approval in connection with certain transactions, including
issuing equity and convertible securities, which are in addition to any applicable
requirements under state law and SEC rules.”).
199 See Gretchen Morgenson, Meet the Shareholders? Not at These Shareholder Meetings,
N.Y. Times (March 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/business/corporatevirtual-shareholder-meetings.html (discussing the “increasingly common corporate practice
of holding annual meetings that offer only online participation for shareholders”).
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problem. Hence, to the extent that stockholders vote based on their
beliefs about what maximizes firm value, the “bug” of deal risk is
actually a “feature.” That said, it is possible that sophisticated
market players may structure their holdings to extract
individualized benefits from deal outcomes, then act to achieve
those outcomes to the detriment of the parties to the transaction
and other market participants.200 That problem, when it arises, can
be addressed directly with targeted remedies. 201
VI. CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence suggests that large public company
acquisitions often destroy significant value for the acquiring firm.
The bidder overpayment phenomenon has been consistently tied to
managerial agency costs and behavioral biases. Corporate law
should take into account and address the behavior of fiduciaries in
making acquisition decisions. One way to determine whether
directors and officers are fulfilling their duty of loyalty in M&A
transactions is to subject these decisions to enhanced scrutiny. With
respect to sell-side decisions, the Delaware courts have developed a
conflict-derived rationale for applying enhanced scrutiny to
decisions of fiduciaries. This Article argues that this rationale
applies equally on the buy-side. Litigation is not without costs, and
the experience of litigation on the sell-side has been less than ideal.
To address the shortcomings of the current litigation regime, the
Delaware courts have encouraged the use of a fully informed
stockholder vote on the sell-side. This Article argues that one of the
primary benefits of extending enhanced scrutiny to the buy-side is
to induce bidders to seek a stockholder vote to mitigate the soft
conflicts that feed into bidder overpayment.

200 See, Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129,
131 (2009) (discussing “empty voting,” where “investors have retained voting rights without
the financial risk attendant to the shares, allowing them to influence a particular vote to the
possible detriment of the corporation as a whole”); cf. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811,
888 (2006) (“One way to address empty voting is to limit the voting rights of shareholders
who hold greater voting than economic ownership.”).
201 See, e.g., Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 387–90 (Del. 2010)
(discussing cause of action and remedies for vote-buying).
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